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The power to amend evidence is not expressly provided under Order XVIII of CPC. The procedure provided under Rule 16 of Order XVIII cannot be construed as power conferred on the Court to undertake ex post facto corrections of the recorded evidence. In the considered view of this Court, Rule 16 deals with power of the Court to examine witnesses immediately. Rule 16(3) refers to the procedure set out in Rules 4 to 6 to and if a correction is pointed out, the Judge is empowered to carry out the corrections, then take the signature of the party and then certify that evidence is recorded. A contemporaneous omission or correction pointed out before signing the evidence has the advantage of drawing the attention of the Court which has recorded the evidence, the counsel present when the evidence was recorded do their part and then and there a bona fide correction can be attended by the Court. On the other hand, if the procedure stipulated in sub-Rule 3 of Rule 16 is extended for correction of evidence available on record, in the considered view of this Court, such procedure leads to an anomalous situation as pointed out by this Court in the decision referred to supra.

No suit against dead person - his legal heirs be brought by impleading petition when or.22, rule 4 C.P.C. was dismissed on technical point - As mentioned supra, it is only if a defendant dies during the pendency of the suit that the provisions of Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code can be invoked. Since one of the defendants i.e. defendant No.7 has expired prior to the filing of the suit, there is no legal impediment in impleading the legal representatives of the deceased defendant No.7 under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code, for the simple reason that the plaintiff in any case could have instituted a fresh suit against these legal representatives on the date he moved an application for making them parties, subject of course to the law of limitation. Normally, if the plaintiff had known about the death of one of the defendants at the time of institution of the suit, he would have filed a suit in the first instance against his heirs or legal representatives. The difficulty that the High Court experienced in granting the application filed by the plaintiff under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code discloses, with great respect, a hyper-technical approach which may result in the miscarriage of justice. As the heirs of the deceased defendant no.7 were the persons with vital interest in the outcome of the suit, such applications have to be approached keeping in mind that the Courts are meant to do substantial justice between the parties and that technical rules or procedures should not be given precedence over doing substantial justice. Undoubtedly, justice according to the law does not merely mean technical justice but means that law is to be administered to advance justice. Having regard to the totality of the narration made supra, there is no bar for filing the application under Order 1 Rule 10, even when the application under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code was dismissed as not maintainable under the facts of the case. The legal heirs of the deceased person in such a matter can be added in the array of parties under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code read with Section 151 of the Code subject to the plea of limitation as contemplated under Order 7 Rule 6 of the Code and Section 21 of the Limitation Act, to be decided during the course of trial. In view of the above, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed. The Trial Court is directed to implead the legal representatives of deceased defendant no. 7 and bring them on record, subject to the plea of limitation as contemplated under Order 7 Rule 6 of the Code, as well as under Section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to be decided during the trial.

i) Whether the second respondent is guilty of willful and deliberate disobedience to the order dated 22-12-2015 passed by this Court in W.P.M.P.No.53654 of 2015 in W.P.No.41555 of 2015 in terms of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971? and ii) Whether the disposal of W.P.No.41555 of 2015 by a final order dated 24-6-2016 recording that miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, stand disposed of as infructuous would have any impact upon the interim order dated 22-12-2015 in relation to which these contempt proceedings were initiated?= In fact, if an order of suspension passed by an employer is suspended by a Court by way of an ex parte interim order, the enforcement of the said ex parte interim order would actually become irreversible. This is for the reason that if the employee is reinstated pursuant to the interim order, he can at the most be placed again under suspension, after the interim order is vacated or the writ petition is dismissed. But the salary paid to the employee during the interregnum, cannot be recovered, as the employee would have worked and earned his salary. Therefore, in a way, the enforcement of an ex parte interim stay/suspension of an order of suspension, is prone to result in irreversible consequences and the learned Senior Judge may not be right in holding that the decision in Yaqoob Khan may hold good only in cases where they become irreversible. Another important aspect is that if an interim order had attained finality then the question of hearing the vacate stay petition does not arise. Therefore, the distinction sought to be made to the decision in Yaqoob Khan cannot be accepted. Hence, on the first question referred to me for consideration, I am of the considered view that the 2nd respondent cannot be held to be guilty of wilful disobedience of the order dated 22.12.2015.; whether the disposal of the main writ petition by a final order, recording an opinion that miscellaneous petitions will stand disposed of as infructuous, would have any impact upon the interim order dated 22.12.2015 in relation to which these contempt proceedings arise.= Therefore, I am of the considered view that the last paragraph of the order of the Division Bench dated 24.06.2016 holding that the Miscellaneous Petitions pending if any, stand disposed of as infructuous, is a clear indication that the petitioner was not entitled to anything more than what was incorporated in the final order passed in the writ petition. The manner in which miscellaneous petitions were closed while disposing of the writ petition, certainly had the effect of annihilating the ex parte interim order dated 22.12.2015 and the benefits arising out of the same. Hence the 2nd respondent cannot be held guilty of wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 22.12.2015.