About Me

My photo

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN -  Practicing both IN CIVIL, CRIMINAL AND FAMILY LAWS,Etc.,

Sunday, July 31, 2016

Crl.M.P. in M.C. filed by the petitioner to set aside the ex parte order dated 16.7.2011.- Trial court dismissed the application = Their Lordships held that The trial Court is directed to set aside the impugned ex parte order on payment of Rs.10,000/- towards costs to the respondents 1 to 3 herein and to restore the M.C., hear both the parties and pass appropriate orders. Till such time, the petitioner is directed to pay Rs.3,000/- per month each to the respondent Nos.1 and 3 towards maintenance.

CRLRC 325 / 2016
CRLRCSR 22959 / 2015CASE IS:DISPOSED
PETITIONERRESPONDENT
BOLLIMUNTHA MOHANA VENKATESWARA RAO  VSBOLLIMUNTHA LAKSHMI & 3 OTHERS
PET.ADV. : SUBRAHMANYAMRESP.ADV. : PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP)

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAJA ELANGO CRIMINAL
REVISION CASE No.325 OF 2016
ORDER: This Criminal Revision Case is filed seeking to set aside the order of the V Additional Junior Civil Judge, Guntur dated 26.02.2015, whereby the learned Judge dismissed Crl.M.P.No.1729 of 2014 in M.C.No.3 of 2011 filed by the petitioner to set aside the ex parte order dated 16.7.2011. Even after service of notice, none appeared on behalf of respondents 1 to 3.
 Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Additional Public Prosecutor. Perused the material on record.
In the circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that the revision can be disposed of with the following direction: The trial Court is directed to set aside the impugned ex parte order on payment of Rs.10,000/- towards costs to the respondents 1 to 3 herein and to restore the M.C., hear both the parties and pass appropriate orders. Till such time, the petitioner is directed to pay Rs.3,000/- per month each to the respondent Nos.1 and 3 towards maintenance. The Criminal Revision Case is accordingly disposed of. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending, shall stand closed. ________________________ JUSTICE RAJA ELANGO 08.02.2016 Tsr

Sections 451 and 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Court below seeking to give interim custody of the case property i.e., goods carrier vehicle bearing No.AP29 TB 6900 = even though the vehicle is liable to be confiscated, no prejudice would caused for investigation if the vehicle is released for interim custody. Therefore, it is directed that the goods carrier vehicle bearing No.AP29 TB 6900, shall be released for interim custody of the petitioner, subject to final orders to be passed in the main case, on petitioner executing a personal bond for Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) with one surety for the like sum to the satisfaction of the XX Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad at Malkajgiri and also on production of original R.C. book. It is further directed that the petitioner shall not alienate the vehicle, shall not change the physical features of the same till the disposal of the criminal case and further the petitioner shall undertake to produce the vehicle as and when required by the Court. However, it is made clear that the present order will not stand in the way of any confiscation proceedings. If already confiscation orders are passed, the order need not be given effect to.


CRLRC 277 / 2016
CRLRCSR 3188 / 2016CASE IS:DISPOSED
PETITIONERRESPONDENT
BHANOTHU BHUKYA, NALGONDA DT.,  VSTHE STATE OF TELANGANA, REP PP.,
PET.ADV. : SREENIVASULURESP.ADV. : PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (TG)


THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAJA ELANGO
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.277 of 2016
ORDER
The petitioner filed this Criminal Revision Case by invoking the provisions under Sections 397 and 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code being aggrieved by the docket order dated 19.01.2016 passed in Crl.M.P.No.29 of 2016 in Crime No.14 of 2016 by the XX Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad at Malkajgiri.
2. Heard and perused the material available on record.
3. Petitioner herein filed the impugned application under Sections 451 and 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Court below seeking to give interim custody of the case property i.e., goods carrier vehicle bearing No.AP29 TB 6900, which was dismissed by the Court below vide impugned order. Challenging the same, present revision is filed. 
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is the owner of the vehicle and if the vehicle is kept idle for a long period, there is every possibility of it getting damaged. He further submitted that the petitioner is ready to furnish sufficient surety and also produce the vehicle as and when required by the Court.
5. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor objects for the same, since the vehicle is involved in a crime. 6. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and even though the vehicle is liable to be confiscated, no prejudice would caused for investigation if the vehicle is released for interim custody. Therefore, it is directed that the goods carrier vehicle bearing No.AP29 TB 6900, shall be released for interim custody of the petitioner, subject to final orders to be passed in the main case, on petitioner executing a personal bond for Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) with one surety for the like sum to the satisfaction of the XX Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad at Malkajgiri and also on production of original R.C. book. It is further directed that the petitioner shall not alienate the vehicle, shall not change the physical features of the same till the disposal of the criminal case and further the petitioner shall undertake to produce the vehicle as and when required by the Court. However, it is made clear that the present order will not stand in the way of any confiscation proceedings. If already confiscation orders are passed, the order need not be given effect to.
7. Accordingly, the Criminal Revision Case is disposed of. Miscellaneous petitions filed in this revision, if any, shall stand closed. ______________ RAJA ELANGO, J 29 th January, 2016 sj

non-disposal of I.A.No.1083 of 2015 in O.S.No.197 of 2011 amounts to inaction = On 14.10.2015, the suit was dismissed for default, as there was no representation. Immediately, the petitioner filed I.A.No.1083 of 2015 on 15.10.2015 itself under Order IX Rule 9 C.P.C. to restore the suit setting aside the order of dismissal for default. It is the contention of the petitioner that on account of dismissal of the suit for injunction, the respondents herein are trying to dispossess him from the schedule property, which may lead to multiplicity of proceedings. The trial Court, despite reporting readiness by the petitioner to proceed with the hearing of the said I.A., is not taking up the matter. Under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court can exercise its power to keep the subordinate Courts within the limits.


CRP 440 / 2016
CRPSR 1977 / 2016CASE IS:DISPOSED
PETITIONERRESPONDENT
MS BHANU TRADERS, NIZAMABAD  VSM/S. KATARI INDUSTRIES, NIZAMABAD & 5 OTHERS


THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.440 OF 2016
ORDER:
This revision is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India questioning the inaction of the Principal Junior Civil Judge’s Court, Nizamabad, in disposing of I.A.No.1083 of 2015 in O.S.No.197 of 2011 having dismissed the suit for default by order date 14.10.2015.
The petitioner is the plaintiff before the trial Court and he filed the suit for permanent injunction and the matter is being contested by the 1 st defendant.
On 14.10.2015, the suit was dismissed for default, as there was no representation. Immediately, the petitioner filed I.A.No.1083 of 2015 on 15.10.2015 itself under Order IX Rule 9 C.P.C. to restore the suit setting aside the order of dismissal for default. 
It is the contention of the petitioner that on account of dismissal of the suit for injunction, the respondents herein are trying to dispossess him from the schedule property, which may lead to multiplicity of proceedings. 
The trial Court, despite reporting readiness by the petitioner to proceed with the hearing of the said I.A., is not taking up the matter. Under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court can exercise its power to keep the subordinate Courts within the limits. 
The power conferred on this Court is supervisory in nature and as the trial Court or the subordinate Court is not taking up the matter, by exercising the supervisory power, this Court can direct the trial Court to decide I.A.No.1083 of 2015 in O.S.No.197 of 2011 within a specified time. Hence, by exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and as non-disposal of I.A.No.1083 of 2015 in O.S.No.197 of 2011 amounts to inaction, the trial Court is directed to decide the said I.A. within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
The Civil Revision Petition is accordingly disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this revision shall stand closed. _________________________________ M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY, J Date:12.02.2016 Note:- Issue C.C. by 15.02.2016 (B/o) KH

C.M.A. was dismissed - No appeal nor revision - these petitions again on the same grounds not maintainable = Even after filing of the suit belatedly, the petitioner failed to evince proper interest in pursuing the same, resulting in dismissal of the suit for default. He has also filed I.A. No.556 of 2008 for restoration of the said suit. Even the said I.A. was also dismissed for default. The petitioner has failed to show diligence in pursuing the subsequent I.A., i.e. I.A. No.777 of 2010 filed for restoration of I.A. No.556 of 2008, by not paying batta. Another interesting aspect is that the petitioner has filed a civil miscellaneous appeal, i.e., C.M.A. No.33 of 2013 before the III Additional District Judge, Guntur, purportedly questioning the order in I.A. No.1156 of 2011, instead of the order in I.A. No.1155 of 2011. The said appeal was dismissed by the learned District Judge, holding that appeal does not lie against an order dismissing the application filed for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Thus, as on today, no appeal against the order in I.A.No.1155 of 2011, is filed by the petitioner. Even if the present revision petition is allowed in favour of the petitioner, the same will not enure to his benefit, as the order in I.A. No.1155 of 2011 remained unchallenged


CRP 168 / 2016
CRPSR 29025 / 2014CASE IS:DISPOSED
PETITIONERRESPONDENT
TATINENI VIJAYA BHASKAR RAO  VSK ARUNA & ANOTHER
PET.ADV. : NAGENDRA REDDYRESP.ADV. : PEDDA BABU


THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.168 OF 2016 DATED:22-01-2016
Between: Tatineni Vijaya Bhaskar Rao … Petitioner
And
K. Aruna and another … Respondents
COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER: Mr. P. Nagendra Reddy
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT NO.1: - COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT NO.2: Mr. G. Ramachandra Rao, for Mr. G. Pedda Babu
THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING: ORDER:
This civil revision petition arises out of common order dt.07.06.2013 in I.A. Nos.1155 and 1156 of 2011 in I.A. No.777 of 2010 in I.A. No.556 of 2008 in O.S. No.136 of 2003, on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri. 
I have heard Mr. P. Nagendra Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. G. Ramachandra Rao, learned counsel, representing Mr. G. Pedda Babu, learned counsel for respondent No.2. The petitioner has filed the above mentioned suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale of the year 1991. On 23.08.2007 the suit was dismissed for default.
The petitioner has filed I.A. No.1095 of 2007 for restoration of the said suit and the said I.A. was renumbered as I.A. No.556 of 2008. The said application was also dismissed for default on 03.03.2010. For restoration of the said application, the petitioner has filed I.A. No.777 of 2010 and the said application was dismissed for non-payment of batta, on 31.12.2010.
The petitioner has thereafter filed I.A. No.1155 of 2011 for restoration of I.A. No.777 of 2010. As there was a delay of 73 days in filing the said application, he has also filed I.A. No.1156 of 2011 for condonation of the said delay.
Both these applications were dismissed by the lower Court by order dt.07.06.2013.
The facts narrated above would show that in respect of an agreement of sale of the year 1991, the petitioner has filed the suit in the year 2003, i.e., twelve years after the execution of the agreement of sale. Interestingly, it is the pleaded case of respondent No.2 that the petitioner himself has executed an agreement of sale in his favour, and later respondent No.1, who is the original owner, executed a registered sale deed in respect of respondent No.2. This plea does not appear to be in serious dispute. Even after filing of the suit belatedly, the petitioner failed to evince proper interest in pursuing the same, resulting in dismissal of the suit for default. He has also filed I.A. No.556 of 2008 for restoration of the said suit. Even the said I.A. was also dismissed for default. The petitioner has failed to show diligence in pursuing the subsequent I.A., i.e. I.A. No.777 of 2010 filed for restoration of I.A. No.556 of 2008, by not paying batta. Another interesting aspect is that the petitioner has filed a civil miscellaneous appeal, i.e., C.M.A. No.33 of 2013 before the III Additional District Judge, Guntur, purportedly questioning the order in I.A. No.1156 of 2011, instead of the order in I.A. No.1155 of 2011. The said appeal was dismissed by the learned District Judge, holding that appeal does not lie against an order dismissing the application filed for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Thus, as on today, no appeal against the order in I.A.No.1155 of 2011, is filed by the petitioner. Even if the present revision petition is allowed in favour of the petitioner, the same will not enure to his benefit, as the order in I.A. No.1155 of 2011 remained unchallenged. In the above facts and circumstances of the case, I do not find any merit in this civil revision petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. As a sequel to dismissal of the civil revision petition, C.R.P.M.P. No.6584 of 2014 shall stand disposed of as infructuous. _______________________ C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY, J 22-01-2016 bnr

Friday, July 29, 2016

Order XXIII Rule 1 applies to the interlocutory applications also.= Order XXIII Rule 1 applies to suit, but I feel that the principle underlying the same is based on public policy, as such, I do not see any reason for not applying the said principle to the interlocutory applications also. = petitioner filed petition under Order 1 Rule 10 and Section 151 CPC to implead him as 7th respondent/7th defendant in the place of 1st respondent/1st defendant to contest the proceedings as a legatee under the Will.= The 1st defendant died on 05.11.2011 due to old age and on her death, the Will dated 29.09.2010 came into operation and he became the legatee of the will and became absolute owner of his mother estate i.e., half share of the suit schedule property. The 1st respondent/plaintiff knowing fully well, have filed a memo stating that she is only legal heir and already succeeded to the half share of his mother. The 1st respondent/plaintiff has no manner of right, title and interest against the property and sought to implead him as 7th respondent/7th defendant to contest the proceedings as a legatee.= But at the same, in the instant case, petitioner cannot maintain the present application for the same cause of action after withdrawal of I.A.No.1 of 2012 filed by him, that too, without obtaining permission to institute the present application. Though the present application is not hit by the principles of res judicata, but whoever waives, abandons or disclaims a right will forego the same. In order to prevent a litigant from abusing the process of the court by instituting suits again and again on the same cause of action without any good reason, the Code insists that he should obtain the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit after establishing either of the two grounds mentioned in Rule 1(3) of the Order XXIII. The principle underlying the above rule is founded on public policy as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P.Gwalior (supra). Though the above said decision was rendered in the context of suit proceedings, but the said principle was made applicable to writ proceedings also, since the same is founded on public policy. Though Order XXIII Rule 1 applies to suit, but I feel that the principle underlying the same is based on public policy, as such, I do not see any reason for not applying the said principle to the interlocutory applications also. In the instant case, the trial Court was right in holding that a fresh interlocutory application is not maintainable before it, in respect of the same subject matter since the earlier interlocutory application had been withdrawn without permission to file a fresh application.

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.RAJASHEKER REDDY          

Civil Revision Petition No.27 of 2016

Dated 02-06-2016

B.Venkata Laxmamma, Died by LR B.Koteswara Rao... PETITIONER      

VERSUS  

Smt. N.Janakamma and others....RESPONDENTS      

Counsel for the Petitioner:  Sri C.Prakash Reddy

Counsel for the Respondents:Sri O.Manoher Reddy.

>HEAD NOTE:  

?Cases referred
1.(2013) 15 Supreme Court Cases 655
2 2012 Law Suit (Ker) 1734
3 2012 (6) ALT 537
4 (2008) 8 Supreme Court Cases 521
5 (1987) 1 Supreme Court Cases 5



HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A.RAJASHEKER REDDY            

C.R.P. No. 27 OF 2016

ORDER :

         This Civil Revision Petition is filed against order in
I.A.No.62 of 2013 in I.A.No.141 of 2004 in O.S.No.41 of 1981
dated 30.10.2015, wherein the petition filed by the petitioner
under Order 1 Rule 10 and Section 151 of CPC for impleading him
as 7th respondent/7th defendant in the place of 1st respondent/1st
defendant in the proceedings as a legatee under the Will was
dismissed.
2.         The parties hereinafter will be referred to as arrayed in the
interlocutory application before the Court below.
        Originally, the 1st respondent/plaintiff filed the suit against
the petitioner, her mother and others for partition and same was
dismissed by the Principal Subordinate Judge, Kurnool.
Aggrieved by the same, the 1st respondent/plaintiff preferred
Appeal Suit No.2072 of 1986 before this Court, which was allowed
by setting aside the decree and judgment of the Court below.  As
per the judgment in the Appeal No.2072 of 1986, the 1st
respondent/plaintiff and 1st defendant are entitled to half share
each in the suit schedule property.  Subsequently, upon
interlocutory application i.e., I.A.No.27 of 2002 filed by the 1st
respondent/plaintiff for final decree for division of suit schedule
property into two equal shares, the Court below allowed the same,
divided the property into two shares and allotted one share to the
1st respondent/plaintiff and other part to the 1st defendant.
           Now the petitioner filed petition under Order 1 Rule 10
and Section 151 CPC to implead him as 7th respondent/7th 
defendant in the place of 1st respondent/1st defendant to contest
the proceedings as a legatee under the Will.   The petitioner is the
2nd defendant in the suit and also 2nd respondent in I.A.No.141 of
2004 filed for ascertainment of mesne profits.  He was allegedly
brought up under the guardianship of 1st defendant i.e,
Smt.Baldlamuri Venkata Laxmamma since his childhood as she is  
issueless.  The petitioner is the legatee under registered Will
D.No.24/2010 dated 29.09.2010 executed by his mother i.e., 1st
defendant towards love and affection.  The 1st defendant died on
05.11.2011 due to old age and on her death, the Will dated
29.09.2010 came into operation and he became the legatee of the
will and became absolute owner of his mother estate i.e., half
share of the suit schedule property. The 1st respondent/plaintiff
knowing fully well, have filed a memo stating that she is only legal
heir and already succeeded to the half share of his mother.  The
1st respondent/plaintiff has no manner of right, title and interest
against the property and sought to implead him as 7th
respondent/7th defendant to contest the proceedings as a legatee.
3.          The 1st respondent/plaintiff filed counter denying the
averments in the affidavit filed in support of the petition stating
that Bandlamuri Venkata Lakshmamma cannot be the mother of  
the petitioner at all as she only fostered him for some years.
Subsequently, petitioner went to Hyderabad and never came to
visit the testator at any time.  The petitioner was married 15 years
back and during the marriage, a quarrel took place between the
petitioner and his mother with regard to handing over of the dowry
to the mother of the petitioner i.e., testator.  While she was
bedridden, she was looked by one Pinjari Gokaramma,
w/o.Moulali, who is a neighbour and remuneration was paid by
the sister's son of late Venkata Lakshmamma.   That Bandlamuri
Venkata Lakshmamma was of unsound mind  and the alleged Will  
was not executed in sound state of mind.  That 1st
respondent/plaintiff  has already succeeded half share of late
B.Venkaakshmamma as her only legal heir, as such, the petitioner
has no locus standi to come on record.
4.          To substantiate the contention of the petitioner, P.Ws. 1
to 3 were examined and got marked Exs.A1 to A3.  On behalf of
the respondents, R.W.1 was examined but no documentary  
evidence was let in on their behalf.
5.         After considering the rival contentions of both parties, oral
and documentary evidence, the trial Court dismissed the
application filed by the petitioner.
6.          Heard Sri C.Prakash Reddy, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Sri O.Manoher Reddy, learned Counsel for the 1st
respondent.
7.          Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Court
below erroneously dismissed the application on the ground that
I.A.No.1 of 2012 filed by the petitioner for impleading him has
been withdrawn.  He would further contend that the said I.A. is
not decided on merits, as such, bar of res judicata will not be
applicable.  In support of his contention, he relied on the
judgments reported in Erach Boman Khavar v. Tukaram Shridhar Bhat
and another , Seetha Ramachandran v. Radhakrishnan  and Ponnuri
Venkata Sai Sivananda Prabhu v. Popuri Sunitha and others .
8.          On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent
submits that I.A.No.1 of 2012 was filed by the petitioner for the
same relief as in the present I.A for coming on record as legatee on
the basis of Will.  After evidence is let in and the matter was
reserved for orders, application was filed for reopening the same
and after same is allowed, petitioner withdrew the said I.A.  As
such, petitioner is estopped from filing the present application for
the self same relief.  In support of his contentions, he relied on the
judgments reported in Jaladi Suguna (deceased) through LRs v. Satya
Sai Central Trust and others  and Sarguja Transport Service v. State
Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P.Gwalior .
9.        In this case, it is to be seen that when the learned counsel
for the petitioner was asked to produce a copy the affidavit filed in
I.A.No.1 of 2012 in I.A.No.141 of 2004 in O.S.No.41 of 1981, the
certified copy of the same was produced before this Court.  A
perusal of the affidavit in I.A.No.1 of 2012 goes to show that the
averments in I.A.No.62 of 2013 are same with that of the
averments in I.A.No.1 of 2012, for impleadment of legal heir of
Smt. B.Venkata Lakshmamma, i.e., defendant No.1 in the suit. 
No reasons are assigned in the affidavit filed in support of
I.A.No.62 of 2013 why interlocutory application i.e.,I.A.No.1 of
2012 was withdrawn earlier, after evidence is let in and after the
said application was reserved for orders.
10.        No doubt, as contended by the learned counsel for the
petitioner since the I.A.No.1 of 2012 is not decided on merits, the
plea of principles of res judicata has no application, as per the
judgment reported in Erach Boman Khavar v. Tukaram Shridhar Bhat
and another (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as
follows:
        "39.  From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that to
attract the doctrine of res judicata it must be manifest that there
has been a conscious adjudication of an issue.  A plea of res judicata
cannot be taken aid of unless there is an expression of an opinion
on the merits.  It is well settled in law that principle of res judicata is
applicable between the two stages of the same litigation but the
question or issue involved must have been decided at earlier stage of
the same litigation."

        There is no dispute with the regard to the above proposition
of law.  But at the same, in the instant case, petitioner cannot
maintain the present application for the same cause of action after
withdrawal of I.A.No.1 of 2012 filed by him, that too, without
obtaining permission to institute the present application.  Though
the present application is not hit by the principles of res judicata,
but whoever waives, abandons or disclaims a right will forego the
same.  In order to prevent a litigant from abusing the process of
the court by instituting suits again and again on the same cause
of action without any good reason, the Code insists that he should
obtain the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit after
establishing either of the two grounds mentioned in Rule 1(3) of
the Order XXIII. The principle underlying the above rule is
founded on public policy as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal,
M.P.Gwalior (supra).  Though the above said decision was rendered
in the context of suit proceedings, but the said principle was made
applicable to writ proceedings also, since the same is founded on
public policy.  Though Order XXIII Rule 1 applies to suit, but I feel
that the principle underlying the same is based on public policy,
as such, I do not see any reason for not applying the said principle
to the interlocutory applications also.  In the instant case, the trial
Court was right in holding that a fresh interlocutory application is
not maintainable before it, in respect of the same subject matter
since the earlier interlocutory application had been withdrawn
without permission to file a fresh application.  The other decisions
relied on by both the counsel have no application to the facts of
the case on hand.  The trial Court also observed that the
petitioner had withdrawn the I.A.No.1 of 2012, which was filed for
impleading him as the 7th respondent in the place of 1st
respondent and for the same relief, the present application i.e,
I.A.No.62 of 2013 has been filed, which is nothing but abuse of
process of law.
        In view of above facts and circumstances, I do not see any
merit in this Civil Revision Petition and the same is liable to be
dismissed.
        Accordingly, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed.  There
shall be no order as to costs.  As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous
petitions, if any, pending in this CRP, shall stand dismissed.

_______________________  
A.RAJASHEKER REDDY, J    
Dated 02-06-2016

Order 19 Rule 2 of CPC to direct the 1st respondent/1st defendant to appear before the court to cross-examine - not maintainable - Order XIX Rule 2 CPC, which reads as under: Power to order attendance of deponent for cross-examination: (1) Upon any application evidence may be given by affidavit, but the Court may, at the instance of either party, order the attendance for cross-examination of the deponent. (2) Such attendance shall be in Court, unless the deponent is exempted from personal appearance in Court or the Court otherwise directs.=The Court below by relying on the judgment reported in Shetty Chandra Shekar and others v. Neeti Ramulu and others (supra) dismissed the application filed by the petitioner on the ground that the deponents of third party affidavits filed in support of plaintiff or defendant can be called for cross-examination but not the affidavit filed by either the plaintiff or the defendant to the proceedings. The Court below also relied on the judgment reported in the case of Smt. Sudha and another v. Manmohan and others , wherein it is held that the request for cross examination of the defendant cannot be allowed if such request could be to protract and delay the proceedings under the main suit. The Court below has rightly relied on the judgment in Shetty Chandra Shekers case and came to the conclusion that the application under Order XIX Rule 2 CPC is not maintainable in respect of the affidavits filed by parties to proceedings and it will apply to the affidavits filed by third parties. In view of above facts and circumstances, I do not see any reason to interfere with the order of the Court below.

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A.RAJASHEKER REDDY            

C.R.P.No.2046 OF 2016  

03-06-2016

Pathange Mohan Krishna Rao   .Petitioner/Defendant no.4

Smt Navale Sreevani and others ..Respondents  

Counsel for the Petitioner:Sri K/Rasthangapani Reddy

Counsel for the Respondents:

<GEST

>HEAD NOTE:  

?Cases Referred:

1. 2013(2) ALT 784
2. 2015 (4) ALT 665
3. 2008 (2) ALT 463
4. 1983 (1) ALT 39=AIT 1983 AP 14
5. 2001 (6) SCC 356=AIR 2001 SC 2293  
6. AIR 1996 Raj 59

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A.RAJASHEKER REDDY            

C.R.P.No.2046 OF 2016  

ORDER :

        This Civil Revision Petition is filed against order dated
14.03.2016 in I.A.No.206 of 2016 in I.A.No.3812 of 2015 in
O.S.No.88 of 2015, wherein the Court below dismissed the
application filed by the petitioner/4th defendant in the suit
under Order 19 Rule 2 of CPC to direct the 1st respondent/1st
defendant to appear before the court to cross-examine her to
elicit the truth in the contents of her affidavit filed in
I.A.No.3812 of 2015.
2.       For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter will be
referred to as arrayed in the interlocutory application.
        It is the case of the petitioner that he is the 4th defendant
in the main suit and defendants 1 and 3 in the main suit filed a
petition in I.A.No.3812 of 2015 praying the Court to direct the
defendants 5 to 7, who are tenants to pay rents to the 1st
defendant in respect of the petition schedule property or to
deposit the rents into the Court to withdraw the same by the 1st
defendant. In order to ascertain the truth, cross-examination of
1st defendant is very much necessary. Hence, the petition.
3.         The 1st respondent/plaintiff filed counter denying the
averments in the affidavit filed in support of the petition stating
that the petitioner is not having good terms with his parents and
sisters for the last four years and that he is not aware of the
health condition of the 2nd respondent i.e., 1st defendant in the
suit.  It is also stated that Order 19 Rule 2 is not applicable in
respect of Interlocutory Applications and examination of
deponent arises only in cases where third party affidavits are
filed.   It is also stated that the cross-examination of 2nd
respondent/1st defendant at this stage is not permissible and
that the 2nd respondent has got only share in the plaint schedule
properties along with other respondents.
4.       Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. None appeared
on behalf of the respondents.
5.       Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the 2nd
respondent is not suffering with any heart disease, as such,
there is no need for depositing the rents into the Court and the
Court below should have allowed the application to cross-
examine the 2nd respondent/1st defendant, but erroneously
dismissed the same on the ground that Order 19 Rule 2 of CPC
has no application to the present case and it is only applicable
when third party affidavits are filed.  He would further contend
that cross-examination can be permitted in respect of the
affidavits filed by parties to proceedings also.  In support of his
contentions, he relied on the judgments reported in Gampa Sai
Ravi Kiran v. Bonda Rama Lakshmi and others , Nadella Estates Pvt.
Ltd. Hyderabad v. Prema Ravindranath and others , Shetty Chandra
Shekar and others v. Neeti Ramulu and others  and Ali Bin Aifan v.
State .
6.       The provision of law under which I.A.No.206 of 2016 is
filed is under Order XIX Rule 2 CPC, which reads as under:
        Power to order attendance of deponent for cross-examination:
(1)     Upon any application evidence may be given by affidavit, but the
Court may, at the instance of either party, order the attendance
for cross-examination of the deponent.
(2)     Such attendance shall be in Court, unless the deponent is
exempted from personal appearance in Court or the Court
otherwise directs.


          In Shetty Chandra Shekar and others v. Neeti Ramulu and others
(supra), His Lordship Honble Sri Justice N.V.Ramana (as he then
was) while dealing with the provision under Order XIX Rule 2 of
CPC held as follows:
        9. A bare perusal of the provisions of Order XIX, Rule 2, would
make it clear that the question of ordering attendance for cross-
examination of the deponent arises only in cases where the third
party affidavits are filed in support of the cases of the respective
parties. The language employed in the provision would not
indicate conferring of any power on the Court to call a person
swearing the affidavit filed in support of the petition, for cross-
examination. The affidavit filed in support of the petition shall not
be treated, as an affidavit filed by way of evidence, and in this
context, it would be relevant, if a reference is made to the
provisions of Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which
defines "evidence" to mean and include all statements which the
Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in
relation to matters of fact under inquiry, such statements are
called oral evidence. In the present case, the respondents-
defendants filed the petition under Order XIX, Rule 2 C.P.C. to
direct the petitioner-plaintiff No. 1 to come to the Court for the
purpose of cross-examination. The question of applicability of the
provisions of Order XIX, Rule 2 C.P.C. would arise only in cases
where an affidavit was filed in support of the cases of the
respective parties i.e. either on behalf of the plaintiff or on behalf
of the defendant, by way of evidence, but certainly not an affidavit
filed in support of a petition. Since the affidavit filed in support of
a petition cannot be treated as evidence, the present petition filed
by the respondents-defendants under Order XIX, Rule 2 C.P.C.
seeking to summon the deponent of the affidavit filed in support
of the petition for temporary injunction, was not maintainable,
and more so when it is not the case of the respondents-
defendants that they intended to summon petitioner-plaintiff No.
1 because he had sworn to the affidavit by way of evidence to
support the case of the plaintiffs. The law is well settled that when
affidavits are filed in a proceeding under Order XXXIX, Rule 1
C.P.C. or any other proceedings, and in case the Court entertains
a doubt, with regard to the identity of the person or persons who
gave the affidavit, then it has the power and discretion to order
the attendance of the deponent of the affidavit, for cross-
examination so as to come to a just concision, to determine such
petition. In such situations, the order passed by the Court below
to summon the deponent for cross-examination cannot be faulted 
and such orders, can neither be said to be illegal nor beyond the
competence of the Court.
      10. In the above view of the matter, it has to be held that the
present application filed by the respondents-defendants under
Order XIX Rule 2 C.P.C. is not maintainable, and the Court below
was not justified in ordering the present application holding that
the respondents-defendants counsel is entitled to cross-examine
petitioner-plaintiff No. 1 who swore to the affidavit filed in support
of the petition for grant of temporary injunction, and more so
when the present application, does not fall within the ambit and
scope of Order XIX Rule 2 C.P.C.
7.      In Gampa Sai Ravi Kiran v. Bonda Rama Lakshmi and others  
(supra), with due respect, though the learned Single Judge has
referred to the judgment of this Court in Shetty Chandra Shekar
and others v. Neeti Ramulu and others (supra), but without
considering the effect of the said judgment, allowed the
application for cross-examination of deponent stating that it is a
valuable right conferred on the parties. The learned Single Judge
has not considered the effect of the aforesaid judgment, which
was rendered after taking into account Section 3 of the Indian
Evidence Act, which defines evidence.
8.      In Nadella Estates Pvt. Ltd. Hyderabad v. Prema Ravindranath
and others (supra), with due respect,  the learned Single Judge,
though referred to the judgment of this Court in Shetty Chandra
Shekar and others v. Neeti Ramulu and others (supra), but has not
considered the effect of the same and also has not considered
the effect of Section 3 of Evidence Act.  However, on merits,
dismissed the applications filed under Order XIX Rule 2 CPC.  In
both the decisions, though reference is made to about the
judgment of this Court in Shetty Chandra Shekar and others v. Neeti
Ramulu and others (supra), but has not taken into account the
effect of Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act and in Ali Bin
Aifans case (supra) also the learned Judge has not considered
Section 3 of the Evidence Act, as such, in my opinion, the
decisions rendered in Gampa Sai Ravi Kiran v. Bonda Rama Lakshmi  
and others (supra) and Nadella Estates Pvt. Ltd. Hyderabad v. Prema
Ravindranath and others (supra) and Ali Bin Aifan (supra) are per
incuriam,  as per the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in
Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd., v. Jindal Exports Limited .
9.      The Court below by relying on the judgment reported in
Shetty Chandra Shekar and others v. Neeti Ramulu and others (supra)
dismissed the application filed by the petitioner on the ground
that the deponents of third party affidavits filed in support of
plaintiff or defendant can be called for cross-examination but
not the affidavit filed by either the plaintiff or the defendant to
the proceedings.
        The Court below also relied on the judgment reported in
the case of Smt. Sudha and another v. Manmohan and others ,  
wherein it is held that the request for cross examination of the
defendant cannot be allowed if such request could be to protract
and delay the proceedings under the main suit.   The Court
below has rightly relied on the judgment in Shetty Chandra
Shekers case and came to the conclusion that the application
under Order XIX Rule 2 CPC is not maintainable in respect of
the affidavits filed by parties to proceedings and it will apply to
the affidavits filed by third parties.
        In view of above facts and circumstances, I do not see any
reason to interfere with the order of the Court below.
        Accordingly, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.  As a sequel thereto,
miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this CRP, shall stand
dismissed.
-------------------------------
A.RAJASHEKER REDDY, J    
03.06.2016.

Order XXVI Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure = suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property from the respondents.for appointment of an Advocate Commissioner to localize the survey numbers 52, 53 and 54 on land along with sub- divisions therein as shown in the plaint plan, and also to localize the extent of Acs.3.50 cents in Sy. No.52/1-B1 on land, with the assistance of District Surveyor and total station instrument, and with the help of municipal survey records and other documents produced by them into the Court and the documents produced by the defendants, and also to arrange for taking necessary photographs and videos.= Under Order XXVI Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the main purpose of appointing an Advocate Commissioner is to elucidate any matter in dispute. It does not appear from the pleadings of the parties that the identity of the property is in dispute and therefore the question of localizing the property does not arise. It is therefore wholly unnecessary for the petitioner to seek appointment of an Advocate Commissioner. Being the plaintiff, the burden is on him to prove his case by producing required evidence and he cannot seek to rely upon the help of an Advocate Commissioner for this purpose. Unless he has material in his possession to show that he has title over the suit schedule property, he should not have filed the suit at all. If, for any reason, the petitioner wants to establish the identity of the property with reference to the boundaries mentioned in the documents on ground, he is always entitled to seek survey of the property by approaching the survey officials on his own, and produce the survey reports and examine the surveyor concerned as his witness. Instead of following this procedure, the petitioner appeared to have devised a shortcut method of filing the application for appointment of an Advocate Commissioner. This, in my opinion, surely is not the purpose for which the Advocate Commissioner is appointed. In the light of the above discussion, I do not find any reason to interfere with the order of the lower Court and the civil revision petition is accordingly dismissed.

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY            

Civil Revision Petition No.2651 of 2016

10-06-2016

K.Sambasiva Reddy  Petitioner

Challa Rama Rao Reddy and others  Respondents    

Counsel for the Petitioner: Mr. S. Sridhar

Counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2: Mr. S.V.R. Subrahmanyam  
                                     Counsel for respondent Nos.3 to 56:    -

<GIST  :


>HEAD NOTE:  


?CITATIONS :

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY          

       
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.2651 OF 2016    


DATED:10-06-2016  


THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:        


ORDER:

        This civil revision petition is filed against order dt.21.4.2016 in I.A.
No.1501 of 2015 in O.S. No.107 of 2013, on the file of the II Additional
District Judge, Visakhapatnam.
        I have heard Mr. S. Sridhar, learned counsel for the petitioner, and
Mr. S.V.R. Subrahmanyam, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2,
and perused the record.
        The petitioner filed the above-mentioned suit for declaration of title
and recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property from the
respondents.  After completion of the pleadings, the petitioner has filed
I.A. No.1501 of 2015 for appointment of an Advocate Commissioner to
localize the survey numbers 52, 53 and 54 on land along with sub-
divisions therein as shown in the plaint plan, and also to localize the
extent of Acs.3.50 cents in Sy. No.52/1-B1 on land, with the assistance of
District Surveyor and total station instrument, and with the help of
municipal survey records and other documents produced by them into the 
Court and the documents produced by the defendants, and also to 
arrange for taking necessary photographs and videos.
        In the affidavit filed in support of the said application, the petitioner
stated that in order to prove his title, he has produced Will dt.10.2.1987,
subsequent Will dt.6.5.2010, patta dt.6.1.1941 and also rough plan.  He
has further averred that the respondents in order to prove their rights
over an extent of Acs.3.50 cents in Sy.No.52/1 B1, produced ground rent
patta proceedings in the court.  That physical inspection of plaint schedule
property to note the stage of construction in the schedule property by an
Advocate Commissioner is necessary because the respondents are trying
to alter the physical features of the property and are proceeding with the
constructions in haste in spite of the pendency of the suit and the
injunction application.  The petitioner further averred that the localization
of the property with the assistance of District Surveyor with the help of
municipal survey records and documents will also enable the Court to
appreciate the rival contentions of the parties and to come to a correct
conclusion.  As the said application was dismissed by the lower Court, the
petitioner has filed this civil revision petition.
        Under Order XXVI Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the
main purpose of appointing an Advocate Commissioner is to elucidate any
matter in dispute.  It does not appear from the pleadings of the parties
that the identity of the property is in dispute and therefore the question of
localizing the property does not arise.  It is therefore wholly unnecessary
for the petitioner to seek appointment of an Advocate Commissioner.
Being the plaintiff, the burden is on him to prove his case by producing
required evidence and he cannot seek to rely upon the help of an
Advocate Commissioner for this purpose.  Unless he has material in his
possession to show that he has title over the suit schedule property, he
should not have filed the suit at all.  If, for any reason, the petitioner
wants to establish the identity of the property with reference to the
boundaries mentioned in the documents on ground, he is always entitled
to seek survey of the property by approaching the survey officials on his
own, and produce the survey reports and examine the surveyor concerned 
as his witness.  Instead of following this procedure, the petitioner
appeared to have devised a shortcut method of filing the application for
appointment of an Advocate Commissioner.  This, in my opinion, surely is
not the purpose for which the Advocate Commissioner is appointed.
        In the light of the above discussion, I do not find any reason to
interfere with the order of the lower Court and the civil revision petition is
accordingly dismissed.
        As a sequel to dismissal of the civil revision petition, C.R.P.M.P.
No.3379 of 2016 shall stand disposed of as infructuous.
______________________  
C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY, J    
10-06-2016

Respondent can not force the petitioner to implead joint tortfeasors as one of the parties to the M.V.O.P. = Now the law is well settled that the liability of joint tort feasors is joint and several. In case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation among tort feasors vis--vis claimant is not permissible. Admittedly, the petitioner is an insurer of the vehicle. The liability of the petitioner is coextensive with that of the owner/insured. It is the primary duty of the claimants to establish negligence and justify their claim. It is for the claimants to file the claim petition against the parties whom they consider as proper or necessary. Now the petitioner, in its written statement, pointed out that there are other parties who are to be impleaded in the claim petition filed by the claimants. In spite of the point raised by the petitioner herein in its written statement, if the claimants do not take necessary steps, they will be doing so at their own risk. It is not for the petitioner herein to force the claimants or the Court to implead some other parties in order to invite a finding on the role of the proposed party in the negligence which resulted in the accident. There is no material to show that the proposed parties are joint tort feasors. Even if it is assumed that some of the proposed parties are joint tort feasors, in their absence also a finding can be recorded with regard to the entitlement of the claimants and the petitioner herein can recover the amount which it was forced to part with due to the role of other joint tort feasors by initiating separate proceedings. But, the summary proceedings in a claim petition arising out of a motor vehicle accident cannot be enlarged and the Tribunal cannot be asked to give a finding with respect to the role of other parties in the accident. The reliance on United India Insurance Company Limited's case (supra) is of no avail as that case arose out of an accident caused by Jayanthi Janatha Express hitting a passenger bus at the unmanned level crossing. The decision was rendered on the facts of that case only and it cannot be extended to the authorities like National Highways Authority of India Limited who undertake laying of the roads.

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.RAMALINGESWARA RAO            

CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos.427 of 2016 and Batch  

Dated 29-04-2016

HDFC ERGO General Insurance Company Ltd......Petitioner  

vs.

Smt.Khawjabi and others.... Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner: Learned Senior Counsel Sri Atul Nanda for A.Ramakrishna Reddy

Counsel for the Respondents: Sri A.Sanjay Kishore

<Gist :

>Head Note :

?Cases referred
1.(2007) 5 SCC 428
2.(2008) 13 SCC 198
3.(2008) 3 SCC 748
4.(2014) 3 SCC 590
5.(2015) 9 SCC 273
6.(2010) 7 SCC 417
7.AIR 1998 SC 640

CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos.427 and 772 of 2016  

COMMON ORDER:                                          

        These two Civil Revision Petitions are being disposed of by
this common order, at the admission stage, as they arise out of
the applications in O.P.No.599 of 2013 on the file of the learned
Principal District Judge, Mahabubnagar, seeking identical
reliefs.

        C.R.P.No.427 of 2016 arises out of an order in I.A.No.1309
of 2014, whereas C.R.P.No.772 of 2016 arises out of an order in
I.A.No.1355 of 2014.  Both the petitions were filed by the second
respondent in O.P.No.599 of 2013.  They were dismissed by a
common order on 18.09.2015, challenging which the present
Civil Revision Petitions are filed.

        A ghastly road accident took place on 30.10.2013 at about
5:10 a.m. on the outskirts of Palem Village on NH-44 road (RHS)
at culvert No.129/1 near KM stone No.128 Hyderabad in front
of 33/11 KV electricity sub-station, where the entire bus was
burnt along with the passengers.  The Volvo bus bearing No.AP
02 TA 0963 started from Bangalore city on 29.10.2013 at about
11 p.m. with total occupancy. When it crossed the Pullor toll
plaza, the driver of the bus appears to have driven it in a rash
and negligent manner and dashed it to the culvert No.129/1 on
the median (which is open to the sky in the middle), as a result
of which the diesel tank was broken, sparks and flames erupted
and total bus engulfed in fire, resulting in death of 45
passengers (including a little child).  The above Original Petition
was filed by three claimants claiming an amount of
Rs.1,00,00,000/- for the death of one Mohammed Asif in the
said accident.  The claim petition was filed against the owner of
the bus, the insurance company and two others.  A written
statement was filed by the second respondent, insurance
company in the said O.P and the relevant portions of the written
statement are extracted hereunder:
      8.  It is humbly submitting that during the course of
investigation by the police authority, it has came into light
that the incident has occurred due to negligent in building the
culvert protruding on the outer side of the highway road
exposing to the risks of accidents by the National Highway
Authority of India (hereinafter referred to as 'NHAI').

        9.  It is submitted that at the very same point of time,
the investigation has revealed the manufacturing defect in the
placement design of the battery and fuel tank in the Volvo
Bus by the manufacturer i.e. M/s.Volvo Buses India Pvt. Ltd.
(hereinafter referred to as 'M/s.Volvo').

        10.  It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble
Tribunal that the petitioners may kindly be directed to join
M/s.Jabbar Travels, the NHAI and M/s.Volvo as they are
found to be necessary parties to the proceedings.

        12.  It is humbly submitted that M/s.Volvo is
negligent in not providing the emergency exit door in the
Volvo Buses and the very same point of time, ARAI was
negligent in approving the design of the bus sparing the safety
of the passengers.  Hence the petitioners may kindly be
directed to join the ARAI as they are found to be necessary
parties to the proceedings.

               
        18.  It is submitted that the luggage compartment of
the bus is meant to carry the baggage of the passengers
traveling in the insured vehicle.  At the material time of the
accident, the respondent/insured and the alleged Lessees had
permitted carriage of the good and parcels viz. baby-corn bags
weighing in tones, cut hairs, cell phones, memory cards,
boxes of flowers, iron, leather photo frames, pumps and
machinery parts, etc. belonging to the entities other then the
passengers.  Hence this Insurance Company is not liable to
pay any compensation.

        21.  This carriage of goods and plying the vehicle as
stage carriage is grossly in violation of the permit and
therefore, this respondent is not liable to indemnify the
insured and/or any other respondents against their Third
party liability.

        27.  It is submitted that further, the placement of the
battery and the fuel tank in the design of the Volvo was found
very close to each other.  There are 3 interconnected fuel
tanks with 600 liters capacity adjacent to the battery
compartment.  It was observed that the impact of the bus
with the culvert led to bursting of the fuel tank and sparks
from the battery which was the resultant effect of the ill-fated
incident of fire in the bus.  With the high fuel capacity, the
fire engulfed the bus rapidly leaving the driver and the
attendant-cleaner incapable to save the lives of the
passengers who were in deep sleep in the early hours of the
morning.

        28.  In view of the above facts, the incident has
occurred solely on of the negligence and neglect of the NHAI  
in building the defective culvert.  Further, M/s.Volvo is
equally negligent in building the wrong design of the bus in
placing the fuel tank and the battery in the proximity to cause
such an ill-fated event and providing the emergency exit to
ensure the safety of the passengers.  It is further submitted
that the ARAI is also negligent in approving the design of the
Volvo Buses which endangers human life.  It is submitted
that the fitness to the said vehicle was issued by the Motor
Vehicle Inspector - RTO Bangalore Central on dt.07.10.2013
who has shown negligence by ignoring the safety precautions
and measures viz. fire extinguishers, emergency exit doors,
hammer to break the window in case of emergency by
allowing the said bus to ply on the road in such unsafe
conditions and hence, the liability may kindly be saddled on
the above mentioned tort feasors and hence this respondent is
not liable to pay any amount of compensation to the
petitioners.


       34.  This respondent submits that the Provisions of
Section 147 makes it clear that the policy of insurance will
have to insure the person (the owner) against any liability,
which may be incurred by him (owner).  Therefore, unless
there is a liability fixed on the owner, the question of the
insurance company indemnifying the owner will not arise.  In
other words, the Act presupposes that before calling upon the
insurance company to satisfy the judgment and awards, it is
precondition that there must be actual liability being cast on
the insured and unless such a liability exists, the question of
the insurance company being saddled with the responsibility
to satisfy the judgment and award, does not arise.


       36.  This respondent craves leave of this Hon'ble Court
to take all defenses available to the Respondent No.1 under
section 170 of M.V.Act and contest the case on all the
grounds apart from those specified U/s.149(2) of M.V.Act."

      I.A.No.1309 of 2014 was filed seeking impleadment of
proposed respondent Nos.5 to 7 therein, who were stated to be
the lessees of the bus, and I.A.No.1355 of 2014 was filed
seeking impleadment of proposed respondent Nos.8 to 11
therein i.e., the National Highway Authority of India, M/s.Volvo
Buses India Pvt. Ltd., Automotive Research Association of India
and the Motor Vehicle Inspector - RTO Bangalore Central,
Bangalore.  The application in I.A.No.1309 of 2014 was
supported by an affidavit stating that on the date of the
accident, the bus was leased to the proposed respondent Nos.5
to 7 therein, who were in possession of the bus and the driver
was under their sole control and hence they are necessary to be
impleaded as parties.  An affidavit was filed in support of
I.A.No.1355 of 2014 with the following averments:
       "I submit that during the course of investigation by the
police authority, it has came to light that the incident has
occurred due to neglect in building the culvert protruding on
the outerside of the highway road exposing to the risks of
accidents by the National Highway authority of India.  To put
it to the records of the Hon'ble Tribunal, it is humbly
submitted that the driver of the above-alleged vehicle was
driving the Volvo carefully, cautiously and with moderate
speed on the correct side of the road.  It was the carelessness,
neglect and the sheer negligence on the part of the NHAI in
building a culvert protruding on the highway road.  It was
observed in the police investigation that the steel railing rod
painted in red is found on the left hand side of the road to
highlight the culvert and the same was found missing on the
right hand side of the road which is the exact spot of the
accident.  In view of the above facts and to adjudicate the
matter on the merits, the National Highway Authority of India
rep. by its Regional Officer is very much necessary party to
implead in the above case as Respondent No.8.

       I submit that the investigation has revealed the
manufacturing defect in the placement design of the battery
and fuel tank in the Volvo Bus by the manufacturer i.e.
M/s.Volvo Buses India Pvt. Ltd.  Further, the placement of
the battery and the fuel tank in the design of the Volvo was
found very close to each other.  There are 3 interconnected
fuel tanks with 600 liter capacity adjacent to the battery
compartment.  It was observed that the impact of the bus
with the culvert led to bursting of the fuel tank and sparks
from the battery which was the resultant effect of the ill-fated
incident of fire in the bus.  With the high fuel capacity the fire
engulfed the bus rapidly leaving the driver and the attendant-
cleaner incapable to save the lives of the passengers who were
in deep sleep in the early hours of the morning.  Further I
submit that the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules framed
thereunder provides for the requirement for the emergency
exit in all passenger carrying buses as is provided in the Volvo
buses of the KSRTC and the same emergency door is absent  
in the present case.  It is the duty of the Automotive Research
Association of India to provide technical expertise in R and D,
testing, certification, homologation and framing of vehicle
regulations.  In view of the above facts and to adjudicate the
matter on the merits, the M/s.Volvo Buses India Pvt Ltd. Rep.
by its General Manager and Automotive Research Association
of India rep. by its Director are very much necessary parties
to implead in the above case as Respondent No.9 and
Respondent No.10.

       I submit that the fitness to the said vehicle was issued
by the Motor Vehicle Inspector, RTO Bangalore Central on
dtd.07-10-2013 who has shown negligence by ignoring the
safety precautions and measures viz. fire extinguishers,
emergency exit doors, hammer to break the window in case of
emergency by allowing the said bus to ply on the road in such
unsafe conditions.  In view of the above facts and to
adjudicate the matter on the merits, the Motor Vehicle
Inspector, RTO Bangalore Central is very much necessary
party to implead in the above case as Respondent No.11."

      The aforesaid applications were opposed by the claimants
as well as by M/s.Volvo Buses India Pvt. Ltd., and the
Automotive Research Association of India.  The claimants
opposed the applications in general and the counter of proposed
respondent No.9 stated that the vehicle involved was more than
four years old and had covered more than 9,00,000 kilometers
without any issues.  There are nearly 5000 Volvo buses running
in India which had covered over a couple of billion kilometers on
Indian roads with an excellent track record of safety.  Finally
they stated that the issue, whether or not the vehicle suffered
from any manufacturing/designing defect is highly technical in
nature and outside the scope of the summary proceedings in a
matter like the present one.  The counter affidavit of the
proposed respondent No.10 stated that it was a registered
Society under the Registration of Societies Act, 1860, and
affiliated to the Department of Heavy Industries, Ministry of
Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises, Government of India.
It is one of the seven testing and certifying agencies authorised
by the Central Government under Rule 126 of the Central Motor
Vehicle Rules, 1989.  Thus, there are six other agencies which
are also so authorised by the Central Government under the
said Rule.  The vehicle involved in the accident was not certified
by the said respondent.  Since the proposed respondent is not a
manufacturer, seller or distributor of the vehicle, it is not a
necessary party.  The applications were ultimately dismissed on
18.09.2015 by the Tribunal, holding as follows:
       "In view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court decision
reported in [2015] Acci.C.R.632 (SC) cited supra; when
there is composite negligence on the part of two or more
persons each of them is jointly and severally liable to the
injured or dependents of the deceased for payment of the
entire damages and the said injured and dependents of the
deceased have the choice of proceedings against all or any of
them and the claimants need not add all the joint tort feasors
in their claim petition.  So, the petitioner/respondent No.2
insurance company cannot dictate terms to the claimants to
ad the other joint tort feasors who had some part in
composite negligence which resulted the accident.  Whereas
in the decissional cited by the learned counsel for the
petitioner/respondent No.2 insurance company, the
claimants therein have added the railways or the Municipal
Corporation of their choice.  So, the decisions cited are in no
way helpful to the petitioner/respondent No.2 insurance
company.  In view of the above said reasons these petitions
are liable to be dismissed."

      Challenging the said order, as stated above, the present
Civil Revision Petitions were filed.

      Learned Senior Counsel, Sri Atul Nanda appearing for the
petitioner submitted that the Tribunal erred in dismissing the
applications and the reasons mentioned by the Tribunal are not
correct.  He further submitted that the presence of all tort
feasors is necessary for recording a finding on the negligence of
the parties before the Tribunal and apportionment of the
liability, in which event, the petitioner would be in a position to
recover the amount from the other joint tort feasors.  The
applications were filed in the interest of the claimants only in
order to adjudicate the dispute effectively.  He relied on
Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Meena Variyal ,
Machindranath Kernath Kasar v. D.S.Mylarappa ,
T.O.Anthony v. Karvarnan , Pawan Kumar v. Harkishan
Dass Mohan Lal , Khenyei v. New India Assurance Company  
Limited , Mumbai International Airport Private Limited v.
Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited  and
Union of India v. United India Insurance Company Limited .

      Learned Counsel for the proposed respondent No.9 in the
O.P opposed the applications stating that the contentions raised
by the learned Senior Counsel are not tenable and the scope of
enquiry by the Tribunal cannot be expanded by including other
parties.

      Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also filed a copy
of the Black's Law Dictionary, (Ninth Edition) showing the
meaning given to "tortfeasor" and "joint tortfeasors".  Though
the learned Senior Counsel drew the attention of this Court to
the above cases, this Court, after going through the ratio
decided in Khenyei's case (supra), thought that the issues
raised by the learned Senior Counsel are substantially covered
in the said decision.  The lower Court dismissed the
applications of the petitioner herein relying on the said decision
only and its reliance on the said decision for dismissal of the
applications appears to be correct in view of the reasons given
below.

      Learned Senior Counsel relied on Meena Variyal's case
(supra) to buttress his argument that the provisions of the
Motor Vehicles Act are still based on tortious liability.  He took
support from that decision to submit that the Tribunal cannot
forget the basic principles of establishing liability and
establishing the quantum of compensation payable.  He also
relied on D.S.Mylarappa's case (supra) in support of his
argument, as in the said case it was held that the employer and
employee are joint tortfeasors and hence they are jointly and
severally liable.  In the said case the Supreme Court held that
the finding of negligence requires the presence of driver and he
should be made a party to the proceedings.  Taking support
from the said observations and extending the said argument,
the learned Senior Counsel wanted this Court to allow the
applications.  The cases of Karvarnan (supra) and Harkishan
Dass Mohan Lal (supra) were relied for the interpretation of
"composite negligence".  Ultimately, he pressed into service the
decision in Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private
Limited's case (supra) to remind this Court that this Court can
add anyone as a plaintiff or as a defendant if it finds that he is a
necessary party or proper party.

      But, as stated above, the issues raised by him, to a large
extent, were answered in Khenyei's case (supra).  The said case
arose out of collision of a bus and trailor-truck.  In the said case
the Supreme Court extensively considered the meaning of the
words "composite negligence" and also the liability of 'joint tort
feasors'.  The Supreme Court ultimately held as follows:
   "15. There is a difference between contributory and
composite negligence. In the case of contributory negligence, a
person who has himself contributed to the accident cannot
claim compensation for the injuries sustained by him in the
accident to the extent of his own negligence; whereas in the
case of composite negligence, a person who has suffered has
not contributed to the accident but due to the outcome of
combination of negligence of two or more other persons. This
Court in T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan ((2008) 3 SCC 748 :
(2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 832 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 738) has held that
in case of contributory negligence, the injured need not
establish the extent of responsibility of each wrongdoer
separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the
extent of liability of each wrongdoer separately. It is only in
the case of contributory negligence that the injured himself
has contributed by his negligence in the accident. Extent of
his negligence is required to be determined as damages
recoverable by him in respect of the injuries have to be
reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence. The
relevant portion is extracted hereunder: (SCC pp. 750-51,
paras 6-7)

     "6. 'Composite negligence' refers to the negligence
on the part of two or more persons. Where a person is
injured as a result of negligence on the part of two or
more wrongdoers, it is said that the person was injured
on account of the composite negligence of those
wrongdoers. In such a case, each wrongdoer, is jointly
and severally liable to the injured for payment of the
entire damages and the injured person has the choice of
proceeding against all or any of them. In such a case,
the injured need not establish the extent of
responsibility of each wrongdoer separately, nor is it
necessary for the court to determine the extent of
liability of each wrongdoer separately. On the other
hand where a person suffers injury, partly due to the
negligence on the part of another person or persons,
and partly as a result of his own negligence, then the
negligence on the part of the injured which contributed
to the accident is referred to as his contributory
negligence. Where the injured is guilty of some
negligence, his claim for damages is not defeated merely
by reason of the negligence on his part but the damages
recoverable by him in respect of the injuries stand
reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence.

    7. Therefore, when two vehicles are involved in an
accident, and one of the drivers claims compensation
from the other driver alleging negligence, and the other
driver denies negligence or claims that the injured
claimant himself was negligent, then it becomes
necessary to consider whether the injured claimant was
negligent and if so, whether he was solely or partly
responsible for the accident and the extent of his
responsibility, that is his contributory negligence.
Therefore where the injured is himself partly liable, the
principle of 'composite negligence' will not apply nor can
there be an automatic inference that the negligence was
50:50 as has been assumed in this case. The Tribunal
ought to have examined the extent of contributory
negligence of the appellant and thereby avoided
confusion between composite negligence and
contributory negligence. The High Court has failed to
correct the said error."

The decision in T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan ((2008) 3 SCC
748 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 832 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 738) has
been relied upon in A.P. SRTC v. K. Hemlatha ((2008) 6 SCC
767 : (2008) 3 SCC  (Cri) 34).

   16. In Pawan Kumar v. Harkishan Dass Mohan Lal
((2014) 3 SCC 590 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 303 : (2014) 4 SCC
(Cri) 639), the decisions in T.O. Anthony ((2008) 3 SCC 748 :
(2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 832 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 738) and
Hemlatha ((2008) 6 SCC 767 : (2008) 3 SCC  (Cri) 34) have
been affirmed, and this Court has laid down that where the
plaintiff/claimant himself is found to be negligent jointly and
severally, liability cannot arise and the plaintiff's claim to the
extent of his own negligence, as may be quantified, will have
to be severed. He is entitled to damages not attributable to his
own negligence. The law/distinction with respect to
contributory as well as composite negligence has been
considered by this Court in Machindranath Kernath Kasar
v. D.S. Mylarappa ((2008) 13 SCC 198 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri)
519) and also as to joint tortfeasors. This Court has referred
to Charlesworth and Percy on Negligence as to cause of action
in regard to joint tortfeasors thus: (Machindranath Kernath
Kasar case ((2008) 13 SCC 198 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 519),
SCC p. 212, para 42)

    "42. Joint tortfeasors, as per 10th Edn. of
Charlesworth and Percy on Negligence, have been
described as under:

     'Wrongdoers are deemed to be joint tortfeasors,
within the meaning of the rule, where the cause of
action against each of them is the same, namely, that
the same evidence would support an action against
them, individually.... Accordingly, they will be jointly
liable for a tort which they both commit or for which
they are responsible because the law imputes the
commission of the same wrongful act to two or more
persons at the same time. This occurs in cases of (a)
agency; (b) vicarious liability; and (c) where a tort is
committed in the course of a joint act, whilst pursuing a
common purpose agreed between them.'"  

   17. The question also arises as to the remedies available
to one of the joint tortfeasors from whom compensation has
been recovered. When the other joint tortfeasor has not been
impleaded, obviously question of negligence of non-impleaded
driver could not be decided. Apportionment of composite
negligence cannot be made in the absence of impleadment of
joint tortfeasor. Thus, it would be open to the impleaded joint
tortfeasors after making payment of compensation, so as to
sue the other joint tortfeasor and to recover from him the
contribution to the extent of his negligence. However, in case
when both the tortfeasors are before the court/Tribunal, if
evidence is sufficient, it may determine the extent of their
negligence so that one joint tortfeasor can recover the amount
so determined from the other joint tortfeasor in the execution
proceedings, whereas the claimant has right to recover the
compensation from both or any one of them.

       
   22. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is as
follows:

   22.1. In the case of composite negligence, the
plaintiff/claimant is entitled to sue both or any one of the
joint tortfeasors and to recover the entire compensation as
liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and several.

   22.2. In the case of composite negligence, apportionment
of compensation between two tortfeasors vis--vis the
plaintiff/claimant is not permissible. He can recover at his
option whole damages from any of them.

   22.3. In case all the joint tortfeasors have been impleaded
and evidence is sufficient, it is open to the court/Tribunal to
determine inter se extent of composite negligence of the
drivers. However, determination of the extent of negligence
between the joint tortfeasors is only for the purpose of their
inter se liability so that one may recover the sum from the
other after making whole of the payment to the
plaintiff/claimant to the extent it has satisfied the liability of
the other. In case both of them have been impleaded and the
apportionment/extent of their negligence has been
determined by the court/Tribunal, in the main case one joint
tortfeasor can recover the amount from the other in the
execution proceedings.

   22.4. It would not be appropriate for the court/Tribunal to
determine the extent of composite negligence of the drivers of
two vehicles in the absence of impleadment of other joint
tortfeasors. In such a case, impleaded joint tortfeasor should
be left, in case he so desires, to sue the other joint tortfeasor
in independent proceedings after passing of the decree or
award."

      The basis for filing the present applications by the
petitioner in the pending O.P is that the proposed parties were
also negligent and in their absence, in the event of holding the
petitioner liable to pay the amount, the petitioner would not be
in a position to recover the amount, if the applications were not
allowed.  Now the law is well settled that the liability of joint tort
feasors is joint and several.  In case of composite negligence,
apportionment of compensation among tort feasors vis--vis
claimant is not permissible.  Admittedly, the petitioner is an
insurer of the vehicle.  The liability of the petitioner is
coextensive with that of the owner/insured.  It is the primary
duty of the claimants to establish negligence and justify their
claim.  It is for the claimants to file the claim petition against
the parties whom they consider as proper or necessary.  Now
the petitioner, in its written statement, pointed out that there
are other parties who are to be impleaded in the claim petition
filed by the claimants.  In spite of the point raised by the
petitioner herein in its written statement, if the claimants do not
take necessary steps, they will be doing so at their own risk.  It
is not for the petitioner herein to force the claimants or the
Court to implead some other parties in order to invite a finding
on the role of the proposed party in the negligence which
resulted in the accident.  There is no material to show that the
proposed parties are joint tort feasors.  Even if it is assumed
that some of the proposed parties are joint tort feasors, in their
absence also a finding can be recorded with regard to the
entitlement of the claimants and the petitioner herein can
recover the amount which it was forced to part with due to the
role of other joint tort feasors by initiating separate proceedings.
But, the summary proceedings in a claim petition arising out of
a motor vehicle accident cannot be enlarged and the Tribunal
cannot be asked to give a finding with respect to the role of
other parties in the accident.  The reliance on United India
Insurance Company Limited's case (supra) is of no avail as
that case arose out of an accident caused by Jayanthi Janatha
Express hitting a passenger bus at the unmanned level
crossing.  The decision was rendered on the facts of that case
only and it cannot be extended to the authorities like National
Highways Authority of India Limited who undertake laying of
the roads.

      The decision of the Supreme Court in Khenyei's case
(supra) is a complete answer to the points raised on behalf of
the petitioner.  The Tribunal also relied on the said decision.  In
view of the same, these Civil Revision Petitions are liable to be
dismissed and are accordingly dismissed.

      It is needless to observe that the dismissal of the
applications filed by the petitioner cannot be construed as an
expression of opinion on the contentions/defences raised by the
petitioner in its written statement and the Original Petition shall
be disposed of on merits uninfluenced by the observations made
herein above.

       The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand
closed.  There shall be no order as to costs.


________________________________    
(A.RAMALINGESWARA RAO, J)      
Dated:29-04-2016

Section 10(2)(ii)(a) and 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) of the Rent Control Act, bona-fide requirement - sublet the premises without permission , = On being shown Ex.P7 photographs, and on being asked whether the persons on the northern side of Ex.P7 Photograph, were the sub-lessees doing business, RW.1 stated that Saheli Suits was a shop run by him as its owner; and on Sundays he only opens his shop, but he did not know who was doing business in front of his shop on either side. As the respondent-tenant, in his evidence affidavit, had stated that he was carrying on business in the name and style of R.S. Enterprises, it is evident that Saheli Suits was not the name of his shop, and the business being carried on in the name and style of Saheli Suits, in the subject property, was by a third party and not the respondent-tenant. No evidence was adduced by the respondent-tenant to establish that Saheli Suits was a partnership firm of which he was a partner. The concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below, that the respondent-tenant had sublet the premises to Saheli Suits without permission of the petitioners-landlords, is based on the evidence on record, and does not necessitate interference in revision proceedings under Section 22 of the Act. Both on the ground of bona-fide requirement, and on the ground that the respondent-tenant had sublet the premises without permission of the petitioners-landlords, both the Courts below were justified in directing his eviction from the subject premises. The order under revision does not necessitate interference.

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN            

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.2521 OF 2016    

08-07-2016

Cheela Narayanarao and another..Petitioners

R.Ajay Kumar. Respondent  

Counsel for petitioners: Sri J. Prabhakar, Learned Counsel
                          appearing on behalf of Sri J. Venkateswara Reddy

Counsel for respondent: Sri Manu

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

? Citations:

1)(1990) 4 SCC 286
2)(1995) 6 SCC 580
3)AIR 1994 Delhi 212
4)(2002) 6 SCC 1 = AIR 2002 SC 2562
5)AIR 1988 SC 1365
6)(2006) 1 ALT 103 (DB) = 2006 (1) LS 54
7)AIR 2008 (NOC) 1341 (Mad.)


THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN            

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.2521 of 2016  

ORDER:                        
       
        Aggrieved by the order passed by the Additional Chief Judge,
City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad in RA No.192 of 2015 dated
06.04.2016, dismissing the appeal preferred by the respondent-
tenant against the order of the Additional Rent Control,
Secunderabad in RC No.112 of 2013 dated 15.09.2015, this
revision, under Section 22 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent &
Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter called the Rent Control
Act), is filed by the tenant in R.C. No.112 of 2013.  Parties shall,
hereinafter, be referred to as they are arrayed in R.C. No.112 of
2013.
        The petitioners-landlords filed R.C. No.112 of 2013, under
Section 10(2)(ii)(a) and 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) of the Rent Control Act,
seeking a direction to the respondent-tenant,  and all others
claiming under or through him, to vacate and deliver vacant,
peaceful, physical and legal possession of the petition schedule
premises to them.  The petitioners filed R.C. No.112 of 2013
claiming to be the absolute owners of premises No.2-1-1 and 2-1-
192 (old Mulgi No.1222), consisting of the ground and first floors
admeasuring 810 square feet situated at General Bazaar,
Secunderabad, by virtue of a Will executed by their grandmother
Smt. Cheela Kanakalakshmi in their favour on 10.12.2006;  Smt.
Cheela Kanakalakshmi was the owner of the petition schedule
property by virtue of a registered sale deed dated 03.05.1957
executed by her vendor in her favour; Smt. C. Kanakalakshmi
expired on 17.02.2008; they entered into a registered partition
deed on 29.10.2013; the subject property was let out by their
grand-mother to the grand-father of the tenant i.e., R. Kanakaiah
and, after his death, his son R. Laxman Rao carried on business in
the said property; the respondent-tenant was in occupation of the
petition schedule property paying a monthly rent of Rs.950/-;   the
respondent owned several commercial properties in the same
locality; he had filed R.C.No.170 of 2002 against their grand
mother Smt. C. Kanakalakshmi and their father Sri C. Ramulu, for
deposit of monthly rent of Rs.950/-, which was allowed;  the first
petitioner needed the entire premises for his personal requirement
for commencing textiles and readymade garment business; the
petitioners do not have any other non-residential premises, except
the petition schedule property in the twin cities of Secunderabad
and Hyderabad;  the second  petitioner is in private service, and
has no objection to the first petitioner carrying on the proposed
business; the second petitioner may also join as a partner in the
said business; the respondent-tenant had illegally sublet a major
portion of the ground floor of the subject mulgi to a third party
who was carrying on business under the name and style of Saheli
Suits; the respondent had also allowed several petty vendors to
carry on business in front of the premises by collecting a hefty
license fee per day; he was not revealing details of the sub-tenant,
and the quantum of rent being collected by him; the petitioners
came to know, through reliable sources, that the respondent was
collecting Rs.750/- per day from the said third party i.e., Saheli
Suits; and subletting of the subject property by the respondent was
without the written or oral consent of the landlords, and was
unlawful.
      In his counter the respondent-tenant denied the allegations
contending that the petitioners were not his landlords and neither
had he ever paid rent to them nor had they claimed rent at any
time as owners of the subject property.  While admitting that the
subject property belonged to Smt. C. Kanakalakshmi, the
respondent-tenant contended that her son C. Sriramulu, (father of
the petitioners-landlords) was the person collecting rents; the
subject property was let out to his grandfather who had
constructed the subject premises thereon at his cost with the
consent of the original owner Smt. C. Kanakalakshmi, and her son
Sri C. Sriramulu; the respondent was a tenant of the petition
schedule property on a monthly rent of Rs.950/-; he was regularly
paying rents to Sri C. Sriramulu who failed to collect the rents that
were due in the year 2002; as such he was compelled to file the
petition in R.C. No.192 of 2002 for deposit of rent; the said R.C.
was allowed, and the respondent was depositing the entire one
year rent in advance, from the date the said petition was allowed;
the deposited amount in the said R.C was withdrawn by Sri C.
Sriramulu by filing a cheque petition; rent of Rs.11,400/- was paid
by cheque No.5361104; Sri C. Sriramulu received rent from Court
for Rs.36,100/- by way of cheque No.536071; the relationship
between the respondent and Sri C. Sriramulu was that of tenant-
landlord; the petitioners, who claimed to be the sons of Sri C.
Sriramulu, had failed to prove their rights over the subject
property; the petitioners grand-mother Smt. Cheela
Kanakalakshmi did not execute any Will in their favour as she died
intestate; the subject Will was not even registered; the age of the
testatrix, when the Will was executed, was 93 years; neither the
Will nor the physical and mental condition of the testatrix was
verified by any medical practitioner; the said Will bears her thumb
impression as the testatrix was an illiterate lady; the name of the
person, who was the scribe of the Will, was not even mentioned;
neither had he sublet the subject mulgi to others nor had he
collected huge rents; and he was permitted in writing, both by Smt.
C. Kanakalakshmi and Sri C. Sriramulu, to carry on business
either in his individual capacity, or in partnership with any third
party as partners, by executing an agreement.
        In his order in R.C. No.112 of 2013 dated 15.09.2015, the
Rent Controller held that the petitioners, who were the sons of Sri
C. Sriramulu and the grandsons of Smt. C. Kanakalakshmi, were
legally entitled to receive rents from the petition schedule property
in view of Section 2(vi) of the Act; the respondent-tenant could not
question the validity of the Will as no right was conferred on him to
do so; it was not open to him to contend that the petitioners had
no valid title; the question of title was not germane to the rent
control case; the Will was not required to be proved; the
jurisdiction of the Rent Controller was limited; the validity of the
Will or the succession of the parties or question of title would not
be examined in Rent Control proceedings; there was no specific
denial by the respondent-tenant that the petitioners-landlords
would not require the subject property for their bonafide
requirement; the petitioners had pleaded that they did not have
any non-residential premises except the subject property in
Hyderabad and Secunderabad; this assertion was not denied by
the respondent in the counter; the respondent did not plead that
the petitioners were in occupation of other non-residential
premises in the twin cities; his contention was that the petitioners
had colluded with Sri C. Sriramulu who was the son of Smt. C.
Kanakalakshmi; it was not the case of the respondent-tenant that
Sri C. Sriramulu was not the son of Smt.C. Kanakalakshmi or that
the petitioners were not his sons; the father had asked for the
bonafide requirement of his son, as the property was owned by
them; the respondent had admitted that Sri C. Sriramulu used to
collect rents even after the demise of Smt. C. Kanaka Lakshmi; the
tenancy was admitted; the person, who was collecting rents from
the respondent, was none other than the father of the petitioners;
the respondent was paying rents to him without any protest; and,
therefore, the jural relationship of the parties was proved.
      The Rent Controller observed that, in the present case, the
petitioners had pleaded that they required the subject property to
start a readymade garment business; a blanket denial by the
respondent that the petitioners did not require the subject
property, and had no experience in textile business, could not be
accepted; Smt. C Kanakalakshmi died in the year 2008; from the
year 2008 till the date of filing the present R.C, the respondent did
not take any steps to file a petition under Section 9(3) of the Act if
he entertained any doubt regarding ownership of the subject
property by the petitioners; the respondent could not challenge the
Will in the status of a tenant; the respondent had failed to
establish that the petitioners were in possession of some other
non-residential building which was suitable for commencing their
new business; the requirement of the petitioners was for their
bona-fide personal requirement to commence textile and
readymade garment business in the subject property as the entire
locality was purely a readymade garment business locality; and the
respondent was liable to be evicted from the petition schedule
property on this ground.
      The Rent Controller further observed that Ex.P-7 photograph
showed that there were petty vendors in front of the subject
property; Ex.P-7 gave a clear picture of the petty vendors, and also
that of Saheli Suits shop in the ground floor of the subject
property; and this was enough to establish that the respondent
had sublet the ground floor of the subject property.  The Rent
Controller concluded that there was a jural relationship between
the petitioners and the respondent; the petitioners, who were the
grandsons of the original owner Smt. C. Kanakalskshmi, were
entitled to receive rents from the respondent; the petitioners had
also proved that their requirement of the subject property, to
commence textile and readymade garment business, was bona-  
fide; they had also proved that the respondent had sublet the
ground floor of the subject property to Saheli Suits; and, on these
grounds, the respondent-tenant was liable to be evicted from the
petition schedule premises.  The respondent-tenant was directed to
vacate the premises within sixty days from the date of the order,
failing which the petitioners-landlords were given liberty to evict
him from the subject property in accordance with law.
      On the respondent-tenant carrying the matter in appeal, the
Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, in
his order in R.A. No.192 of 2015 dated 06.04.2016, held that the
respondent, who was only a tenant in the subject property, had no
right to question the validity of the Will; persons, who were entitled
to question the validity of the Will, were only the legal heirs of Smt.
C. Kanaka Lakshmi; the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller and the
Appellate Authority was limited and it could not, as a Civil Court,
decide the dispute relating to title over the property; the
respondent-tenant had suggested to PW.2 (father of the
petitioners-landlords), during cross-examination, that he was not
present at the time of execution of the Will by his mother; PW.2
denied the suggestion and this indicated that, according to the
respondent-tenant, the mother of PW.2, who happened to be the
paternal grandmother of the petitioners-landlords, had executed
the Will, and at the time of execution PW.2 was not present;  in his
evidence PW.2 had stated that, by virtue of Ex.P3 Will, the
petitioners had become the owners of the subject property and its
landlords; the respondent-tenant automatically became the tenant
of the petitioners and, in between them, a jural relationship came
into existence; they had every right to ask for the subject property
for their personal  bona-fide occupation; the respondent-tenant
had failed to furnish any details of the non-residential
accommodation which he alleged was owned by the petitioners;
even if the first petitioner had no experience in textile business, the
petitioners, being the owners of the subject property, were entitled
to seek eviction of the respondent-tenant from the subject property
on the ground of personal bona-fide requirement; and they were
able to place convincing evidence to establish that their personal
bona-fide requirement was genuine.
      The Appellate Court further held that the photographs in
Ex.P7 disclosed the existence of Saheli Suits in the subject
property; the respondent-tenant did not deny the contents of Ex.P7
photograph; according to him, the business of Saheli Suits was
being carried on by him in partnership, and he relied on Ex.R-1 in
this regard; he further stated that he did not sublet it to any one as
alleged; in his evidence in chief-affidavit, the respondent-tenant
had mentioned that he had carried on business under the name
and style of R.S. Enterprises in the subject property; as he had
himself claimed that he was carrying on business in the name and
style of R.S. Enterprises, there was no necessity for him to enter
into a partnership with Saheli Suits; his evidence was self-
contradictory; if really he was in partnership with others, and was
carrying on business under the name and style of Saheli Suits in
the subject property, he would have mentioned the names of his
partners, and would have stated whether the partnership was oral
or in writing; and the contradictory versions in the evidence in
chief of the respondent-tenant indicated that he had sublet the
petition schedule property to a third party i.e. Saheli Suits.  The
Appellate Court dismissed the appeal without costs confirming the
eviction order passed, in R.C. No.112 of 2013 dated 15.09.2015, by
the Additional Rent Controller, Secunderabad.  The respondent-
tenant was directed to vacate and handover vacant possession of
the subject property to the petitioners-landlords within two months
from the date of the judgment, failing which, the petitioners-
landlords were given liberty to seek his eviction under due process
of law.
      Before this Court Sri J. Prabhakar, Learned Counsel
appearing on behalf of Sri J. Venkateswara Reddy, Learned
Counsel for the respondent-tenant, would submit that there is no
jural relationship of landlords and tenant between the petitioners
and the respondent; in the absence of a jural relationship, R.C.
No.112 of 2013 was not maintainable; while a tenant was no doubt
disentitled to dispute the Will more so in rent control proceedings,
it was open to him to show that the Will was not genuine to show
lack of jural relationship between the petitioner and himself as
landlords and tenant; as the claim of respondent-tenant is bona-
fide, the petitioners-landlords should have been relegated to the
remedy of a civil suit, and not to invoke the jurisdiction of the Rent
Controller; there was no attornment of the tenancy by the
respondent; the proviso to Section 10 of the Rent Control Act bars
institution of proceedings for three months from the date of
acquisition; the attornment took place only when the father of the
petitioners-landlords entered into the box, and not earlier when the
Rent Control case was filed; the respondent-tenant was never
informed, at any time before the present rent control proceedings
were instituted, that the petitioners had become the owners of the
subject property; the burden of proving their bona-fide
requirement was on the petitioners-landlords; mere assertion that
they intend starting a readymade garment business is insufficient;
some proof ought to have been adduced to show that their claim is
genuine; the vague statement of PW.1, of opening a garment shop
would not constitute sufficient proof of bona-fide requirement; both
the Courts below erred in holding that there were hawkers outside
the premises; the burden of establishing that the respondent-
tenant had sublet the premises was on the petitioners-landlords;
both the Courts below had misconstrued the lease-deed; the
finding recorded by the Court below were perverse as the burden
was shifted by them on to the tenant; and proceedings not on
record cannot be considered in the present revision petition.

      On the other hand Sri Manu, Learned Counsel for the
petitioner-landlords, would submit that the landlady, the original
owner of the subject property, expired in the year 2008; by virtue
of the Will, the petitioners became the owners of the subject
property; it is not open to the tenant to dispute the title of the
landlords in proceedings under the Rent Control Act; there is no
provision under the Rent Control Act contrary to Section 109 of the
Transfer of Property Act (TP Act for short) prescribing attornment
by the tenant as a pre-condition for instituting proceedings for
eviction thereunder; there was no denial by the respondent-tenant,
in his counter, regarding the petitioners-landlords bona-fide
requirement of the subject property; the concurrent finding
recorded by both the Courts below establish that the respondent-
tenant had sublet the premises; and, as these findings are not
perverse, this Court would not interfere therewith in proceedings
under Section 22 of the Rent Control Act.

      Section 10 of the Rent Control Act relates to eviction of
tenants and sub-section (1) thereof stipulates that the tenant shall
not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise,
except in accordance with the provisions of Sections 10, 12 or 13
of the Act.  The proviso thereto stipulates that, where the tenant
denies the title of the landlord, the controller shall decide whether
the denial or claim is bonafide and, if he records a finding to that
effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant
in a Civil Court, and the Court may pass a decree for eviction on
any of the grounds mentioned in the said Section, notwithstanding
that the Court finds that the claim is unfounded.  In the present
case both the Courts below have held that the respondent-tenants
denial of title of the petitioner-landlords was unfounded i.e., it was
not bonafide; and the petitioners were the landlords of the subject
property of which the respondent was the tenant.
      In proceedings for eviction of a tenant, the Court will take
only a prima facie decision on the collateral issue whether the
applicant was the landlord.  The Court is only required to satisfy
itself that the person seeking eviction is a landlord who has, prima
facie, the right to receive the rent of the property in question. In
order to decide whether denial of the landlords title by the tenant
is bona fide, the Court may have to go into the tenants contention
on the issue, but the Court is not to decide the question of title
finally as it has only to ascertain whether, in the circumstances of
the case, the tenants denial of title of the landlord is bonafide.
(LIC v. India Automobiles & Co. ; Ranbir Singh (Dr) v. Asharfi
Lal ).
      The fact that the subject property belongs to Smt. C. Kanaka
Lakshmi has been admitted by the respondent-tenant. What has
been disputed is the petitioners-landlords claim to ownership of
the subject property on the basis of a Will executed in their favour
by Smt. C. Kanakalakshmi.  The respondent-tenant contends that,
consequent on the death of Smt. C. Kanaka Lakshmi, it is her son
Sri C. Sriramulu (father of the petitioners) who became the owner
of the subject property; as the present proceedings was instituted
not by him, but by his sons, there is absence of a jural relationship
of landlord and tenant between the sons of Sri C. Sriramulu and
the respondent-tenant; and the petitioners are, therefore, not
entitled to seek his eviction.  Emphasis is placed by Sri J.
Prabhakar, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent-tenant, on the fact that, way back in the year 2010, it
was Sri C. Sriramulu who received the money deposited by the
respondent-tenant in the Court. Learned Counsel would rely on
Ranbir Singh (Dr)2 in this regard.
      In the petition filed in R.C. No.112 of 2013, the petitioners
stated that they were the absolute owners of the subject property
by virtue of the Will executed in their favour by their grandmother
Smt. C. Kanaka Lakshmi on 10.12.2006, and that Smt. C. Kanaka  
Lakshmi expired on 17.2.2008.  In the counter filed thereto, the
respondent-tenant asserted that the petitioners were not the
landlords, they had never claimed any rent from him as the
owners, the subject property belonged to Smt. C. Kanaka Lakshmi,
it was her son Sri C. Sriramulu (father of the petitioners) who was
collecting rents from him since a very long time, the relationship
between him and Sri C. Sriramulu was that of landlord and tenant
and the petitioners, who claimed to be the landlords, had to prove
their right over the subject property.  While contending that Smt.
C. Kanaka Lakshmi died intestate and was not in a condition to
execute any Will bequeathing the property in favour of the
petitioners, the respondent-tenant also contended that the alleged
Will was not registered, and the mental condition of Smt. C.
Kanakalakshmi had not been verified by any medical practitioner.
      Sri C. Sriramulu was the 2nd respondent in R.C. No.179 of
2002 filed by the respondent-tenant, and Smt. C. Kanaka Lakshmi
was the first respondent therein. The order of the Additional Rent
Controller, in R.C. No.179 of 2002 dated 25.07.2003, takes note of
the assertion of Sri C. Sriramulu in cross-examination that it was
Smt. C. Kanaka Lakshmi who was the absolute owner and  
landlady of the subject property.  The mere fact that, after the
death of Smt. C. Kanaka Lakshmi, Sri C. Sriramulu (i.e the 2nd
respondent in R.C.No.179 of 2002), had collected the rent, which
the respondent-tenant had deposited in Court to the credit of R.C.
No.179 of 2002, would not make him the owner of the property or
the landlord as the amounts so deposited could also have been
collected by him on behalf of the petitioners who became the
landlords of the subject property subsequent to the death of Smt.
C. Kanaka Lakshmi on 17.02.2008.
      Clause (iii) of Section 3 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of
Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 defines landlord to mean any person
who, for the time being, was receiving or was entitled to receive the
rent of any premises, whether on his own account or as an agent,
trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so
receive or be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to
a tenant. Clause (vii) of Section 3 of the said Act defined tenant as
the person by whom or on whose account or behalf rent is or, but
for a contract express or implied, would be payable for any
premises to his landlord including the person who is continuing in
its possession after the termination of his tenancy otherwise than
by a decree for eviction passed under the provisions of the Act.
While considering these provisions the Supreme Court, in Ranbir
Singh (Dr)2), observed that the question of title of the property is
not germane for a decision in an eviction suit; where the plaintiff
institutes a suit for eviction of his tenant, based on the
relationship of landlord and tenant, the scope of the suit is limited
in which the question of title cannot be gone into; the plaintiffs
Suit would be dismissed even if he succeeds in proving his title but
fails to establish privity of the contract of tenancy; and in a suit for
eviction the Court has only to decide whether the defendant is the
tenant of the plaintiff or not, though the question of title, if
disputed, may be incidentally gone into in connection with the
main question regarding the relationship between the litigating
parties.
      Section 2(vi) of the Rent Control Act defines landlord to
mean the owner of a building and includes a person who is
receiving, or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on
his own account or on behalf of another person or on behalf of
himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator,
receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled
to receive the rent, if the building were let out to a tenant.  Sri C.
Sriramulu, the son of Smt. C. Kanaka Lakshmi, himself deposed as
PW.2 that his sons, who were the petitioners in R.C. No.112 of
2013, were the absolute owners of the subject property by virtue of
a Will executed in their favour by his mother Smt. C. Kanaka
Lakshmi on 10.12.2006 in a sound state of mind; his mother
expired on 17.02.2008; and, after 17.02.2008, his sons were the
absolute owners and the landlords of the subject property.   As has
been rightly observed by both the Courts below, it is not open to
the respondent-tenant to question the genuineness of the Will, or
the title of the petitioners-landlords over the subject property, in
rent control proceedings.  Both the Courts below rightly held that
these are all matters extraneous to the proceedings under the Act.
As the petitioners are the owners of the building, having been
bequeathed the property under the Will executed in their favour by
their grandmother Smt. C. Kanaka Lakshmi, they are entitled, as
the landlords, to institute proceedings, for eviction of the
respondent-tenant under the Act, before the Rent Controller. The
contention, that the petitioners were not the landlords and there is
no jural relationship of landlords and tenants between them and
the respondent-tenant, does not therefore merit acceptance.
      The contention that there was no attornment of the tenancy
by the respondent-tenant, the attornment took place only when Sri
C. Sriramulu deposed as PW.2 and not before the Rent Control
case was filed, and therefore, R.C.No.112 of 2013 is not
maintainable, is only to be noted to be rejected.   To attorn means
to agree to become a tenant of one as the owner, or as a landlord of
a property previously owned or held by another, or to agree to
recognise a new owner of a property or estate and to promise
payment of rent to him. (Estoppel by Representation by Spencer
Bower & Turner-III Edn.).  The word "attorn" means 'transfer:
make legal acknowledgment of a new landlord.'  "To attorn" merely
means to acknowledge the relationship of a tenant to a new
landlord. "Attornment" by the tenant would mean acceptance of
the new owner as the landlord, and would estop the tenant from
disputing the landlord's title thereafter.  Payment or non-payment
to a new landlord does not affect the relationship created by
attornment. "Attornment" also implies continuity of tenancy,
though the landlord might change when title to the property
passes by sale or otherwise. (Mohd. Ilyas v. Mohd. Adil ; Black's
Law Dictionary; Legal Glossary (1988 Edition) issued by the
Ministry of Law & Justice; Concise Oxford Dictionary).
      The common law rule that a landlord cannot split the unity
and integrity of the tenancy, so as to result in possession over a
part of the demised premises being recovered from the tenant, does
not apply in India because of Section 109 of the TP Act which
provides a statutory exception to this rule and does away with the
need for a consensual attornment. The attornment is brought
about by operation of law, and does not need the consent of the
tenant. (Nalakath Sainuddin v. Koorikadan Sulaiman ; Mohar
Singh v. Devi Charan ).  Section 109 of the TP Act makes it clear
that the landlord can transfer his property in favour of a third
party during the subsistence of the lease, and the consent of the
tenant is not necessary.  In the light of Section 109 of the TP Act
attornment automatically follows, on the transfer of property, on
the same terms and conditions on which the transferor entered
into the lease agreement with the tenant unless there is a contract
to the contrary. (Shankaramma v. Mohd. Abdul Hameed ).
      Attornment of tenancy is not a pre-condition, under Section
109 of the TP Act, for a landlord to initiate proceedings against his
tenant.  Even if no notice is issued by the landlord, after taking a
sale deed in his favour in respect of the subject property from the
original owner, a Suit for eviction is maintainable. (Natarajan v.
Manimegalai ). Attornment automatically follows on the transfer of
property on the same terms and conditions on which the transferor
entered into a lease agreement with the tenant unless there is a
contract to the contrary. (Shankaramma6).  The consent of the
tenant is unnecessary to transfer the property in favour of a third
party.   Since attornment is not necessary under Section 109 of the
TP Act, the tenant cannot dispute the right of the transferee to
maintain a suit for eviction or to claim rent. A transferee of the
landlord's rights steps into the shoes of the transferor-landlord,
with all the rights and liabilities in respect of the subsisting
tenancy. This Section does not insist that the transfer of the
landlord's rights can take effect only if the tenant attorns.
(Shankaramma6).
      There is no specific provision under the Rent Control Act
providing for a situation contrary to Section 109 of the TP Act.  The
concept of attornment of tenancy governed by Section 109 of the
TP Act, and the lessor and lessee relationship, are applicable to
proceedings under the Rent Control Act also. (Shankaramma6).
The transferee of a landlord is thus entitled to collect rent as of
right and he is a landlord under the inclusive definition in Section
2(vi) of the Rent Control Act.  (Shankaramma6). A transferee of the
landlord's rights steps into the shoes of the transferor-landlord
with all the rights and liabilities in respect of the subsisting
tenancy. The statute does not insist that transfer of the landlord's
rights can take effect only if the tenant attorns. Attornment by the
tenant being unnecessary, to confer validity on the transfer of the
landlord's rights, the tenant cannot dispute the right of the
transferee-landlord to maintain an application for eviction or to
claim rent.  (Shankaramma6). As attornment by the respondent-
tenant is unnecessary, the petitioners-landlords were entitled to
institute proceedings under the Rent Control Act for eviction of the
respondent-tenant and the contention, that the Rent Control
proceedings in R.C.No.112 of 2013 was not maintainable, in the
absence of attornment prior to its institution, therefore
necessitates rejection.
      Under the proviso to Section 10(3) of the Act, a person who
becomes a landlord after the commencement of the tenancy by an
instrument inter vivos shall not be entitled to apply under this
clause before the expiry of three months from the date on which
the instrument was registered.  Reliance placed by Sri J.
Prabhakar on the aforesaid proviso is misplaced as the rent control
proceedings were instituted in the year 2013, more than five years
after the death of Smt. C. Kanakalakshmi in the year 2008, and
nearly seven years after the Will was executed on 10.12.2006 by
Smt. C. Kanakalakshmi in favour of her grandsons i.e., the
petitioner in the rent control proceedings. While the petitioners no
doubt became the landlords after commencement of the tenancy
(as the subject premises was let out to the respondents grand
father by Smt. C. Kanakalakshmi), their title to the property is in
terms of the Will which is not compulsorily registerable.  The
proviso to Section 10(3) of the Act has, therefore, no application.
      Section 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) of the Rent Control Act enables a
landlord, subject to the provisions of clause (d), to apply to the
Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in
possession of the building, in case it is a non-residential building,
if the landlord is not capable of occupying a non-residential
building in the city, which is his own or to the possession of which
he is entitled whether under the Act or otherwise for the purpose of
a business which, in the opinion of Controller, the landlord
bonafide proposes to commence.
      The specific assertion in the petition filed in R.C.No.112 of
2013, that the first petitioner required the subject property for his
personal requirement i.e to commence a textile readymade
garments business, was not denied in the counter filed by the
respondent-tenant.  In his evidence as PW.1, the first petitioner
stated that he needed the subject property for his personal
requirement for commencing a textile readymade garments
business.  In cross-examination the first petitioner denied carrying
on printing press business.  Sri C. Sreeramulu, in his evidence as
P.W-2, deposed that the subject property was required by the
petitioners to commence a textile and readymade garments
business.  Both the Courts below were satisfied that the petitioners
required the subject property to start a readymade garments
business, and their requirement was bonafide.  I see no reason to
take a different view from that of the Courts below as the aforesaid
findings are supported by the evidence on record.
      Section 10(2) of the Act stipulates that a landlord, who seeks
to evict his tenant, shall apply to the Controller for a direction in
that behalf.  Section 10(2)(ii)(a) of the Act provides that if the
controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of
showing cause against the application, is satisfied that the tenant
has, without the written consent of the landlord, transferred his
right under the lease or has sub-let the entire building or any
portion thereof if the lease does not confer on him any right to do
so, the Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put
the landlord in possession of the building and, if the controller is
not so satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application.
      In support of their claim that the respondent-tenant had
sublet the premises to Saheli Suits, the petitioners have asserted in
their petition that the respondent-tenant had illegally sublet a
major portion of the ground floor of the subject property to a third
party, the said third party was carrying on business under the
name and style of Saheli Suits, and they came to know that the
respondent-tenant was collecting Rs.750/- per day from the said
third party.  They also asserted that the respondent-tenant had
allowed several petty vendors to carry on business, in front of the
subject property, on the steps and on the pail, collecting hefty
license fee per day.  While denying having sublet the premises, the
respondent-tenant stated in his counter that Sri C. Kanaka
Lakshmi and Sri C. Sriramulu had permitted him in writing to
carry on any business either in his individual capacity or in
partnership with any third party as partners by executing an
agreement. In his evidence affidavit, the respondent-tenant stated
that he was carrying on business in the subject premises under
the name and style of R.S. Enterprises; both Smt. C. Kanaka
Lakshmi and her son Sri C. Sriramulu had given in writing that
the respondent-tenant could be permitted to enter into a
partnership with Saheli Suits; and as such the allegation, that they
had illegally and without the written consent of the petitioners
sublet the premises, was false.
      As has been held by the Appellate Court, the respondent-
tenant has taken contradictory stands.  On the one hand, he
contended that Saheli Suits was a shop run by him as its owner,
and on the other he stated that Smt. C. Kanaka Lakshmi and Sri
C. Sriramulu had consented in writing that he could sublet the
subject property, and the consent was given on a stamp paper.  He
denied the suggestion that there was no such document, hence he
did not file it before the Court, and he was deposing falsely about
the document.  In his evidence affidavit, the respondent-tenant
stated that he was permitted to let out the subject property by
entering into a partnership with Saheli Suits. The fact, however,
remains that it is not even his case that he was authorized to
sublet the premises to a third party.
      The fact that the business was being carried on in the
subject premises, under the name and style of Saheli Suits, was
admitted by the respondent-tenant during his cross-examination
as RW.1. On being shown Ex.P7 photographs, and on being asked    
whether the persons on the northern side of Ex.P7 Photograph,
were the sub-lessees doing business, RW.1 stated that Saheli Suits
was a shop run by him as its owner; and on Sundays he only 
opens his shop, but he did not know who was doing business in
front of his shop on either side.  As the respondent-tenant, in his
evidence affidavit, had stated that he was carrying on business in
the name and style of R.S. Enterprises, it is evident that Saheli
Suits was not the name of his shop, and the business being carried
on in the name and style of Saheli Suits, in the subject property,
was by a third party and not the respondent-tenant. No evidence
was adduced by the respondent-tenant to establish that Saheli
Suits was a partnership firm of which he was a partner.  The
concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below, that
the respondent-tenant had sublet the premises to Saheli Suits
without permission of the petitioners-landlords, is based on the
evidence on record, and does not necessitate interference in
revision proceedings under Section 22 of the Act.
      Both on the ground of bona-fide requirement, and on the
ground that the respondent-tenant had sublet the premises
without permission of the petitioners-landlords, both the Courts
below were justified in directing his eviction from the subject
premises.  The order under revision does not necessitate
interference.  The Civil Revision Petition fails and is, accordingly,
dismissed. The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall also
stand dismissed.  There shall be no order as to costs.


______________________________    
RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J.      
Date:  08-07-2016


      After the judgment was pronounced, an oral request has
been made by Sri J.Venkateswara Reddy, learned counsel for the
respondent-tenant, that the respondent-tenant be granted four
months time to voluntarily vacate the said premises.
        In case, the respondent-tenant files an affidavit of
undertaking before the Court below, within ten days from today,
undertaking to voluntarily and unconditionally vacate the premises
and hand over peaceful possession thereof to the petitioner-
landlords within four months from today, the petitioner-landlords
shall not take coercive steps to evict the respondent-tenant from
the subject premises.  It is made clear that, in case an affidavit of
undertaking is not filed within ten days from today, it is open to
the petitioner-landlords to proceed and take action for eviction of
the respondent-tenant from the subject premises in accordance
with law.
______________________________    
RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J.      
Date:  08-07-2016