Posts

Sub-Registrar/Registering Authority under the A.P. Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 (for short “Act 1977”) objections to register a document under Section 22-A of the Act. - lands assigned prior to 1954 without the condition of non-alienability =The competent authority shall prepare the list of assigned lands with the condition of non-alienability and forward the list to Sub-Registrar/Registering Authority under the A.P. Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 (for short “Act 1977”). The petitioners who claim to have lands assigned prior to 1954 without the condition of non-alienability are given liberty to place details of assignment and decisions of this Court on the applicability of “Act 1977” to such assignment, for updating and operating the prohibitory list by these authorities under Section 22-A of the Act. - The respondent/Government having regard to a particular fact situation, if is desirous of including land assigned prior to 1954 in prohibitory list and claims interest in the property, the prohibition of such registration shall be by way of a notification under Section 22-A(1)(e) of the Act. It is open to the aggrieved party to assail such notification, if any, issued by the authority competent. It is made clear that refusal of registration by S.R.O in a given case results in fresh cause of action and the party aggrieved, by such rejection, is given liberty to pursue the legal remedies available to him/her in law.

suit for declaration that he is the owner of the plaint schedule property and for recovery of possession of the property from the respondent by directing the respondent to remove the tin shed construction and two rooms therein by way of mandatory injunction. - basing on allotment letter by defendant society and basing on injunction decree - mere letter of allotment cannot confer title as it is not a registered sale deed - Trial court and Appellant court rightly dismissed the suit despite of the fact that the defendant remained exparte = It is settled law that in a suit filed for declaration of title and recovery of possession, burden of proof lies on the plaintiff and he must succeed on the strength of his own title (Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos Vs. Thukalan Paulo Avira and Ors. [1] and Union of India and Others Vs. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited and others [2] ). None of the documents filed by appellant establish his title to the plaint schedule property and admittedly the appellant has no registered sale deed executed by the above Society in his favour.

rehabilitation scheme - the allotment proceedings did not contain any prohibition on alienation of the property.trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the respondent. The appellate court confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court, - held that there is no wrong to interfere - Dismissed the appeal

Whether the order of the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation & Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Ranga Reddy is legal, proper and correct in respect of granting interest ? The next objection of insurance company is that the lower authority has granted interest, though Workmen’s Compensation Act does not provide any provision for payment of interest. But as seen from the order of lower authority it granted interest by relying on judgment of the Supreme Court. Both sides have not disputed the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions referred to in the order of lower authority, therefore, objection of insurance company with regard to interest is also not tenable.

the appeal is dismissed for non-compliance of the order by nor furnishing correct address of accuse = The Public Prosecutor is not able to say as to whether they could furnish the correct address of the accused. Having regard to the same and as the accused is already convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years for the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC, the appeal is dismissed for non-compliance of the order dated 27.01.2015. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed

eschewed the evidence in chief of D.W.3 and held that he shall not be entitled to depose as a witness in that suit as he was present through out the cross examination of DW2 =If a party to a suit intends to examine more witnesses than one, the basic requirement is that when one of the witnesses is being examined, others who are proposed to be examined as witnesses, are not present in the Court. If they are present, they would naturally become alert and fill the lacunae, that may be left in the evidence of the person, who is already examined as a witness. The Law does not permit this. However, exactly the same thing has happened in the instant case. When the cross-examination of D.W.2 was in progress, a person who is proposed to be examined as D.W.3, was present in the Court through out. The trial Court has taken correct view of the matter, when it held that the evidence of D.W.3 cannot be recorded at all and that the affidavit filed by him in lieu of chief-examination is liable to be eschewed from consideration. If at all anything, the trial Court has only enforced a fundamental principle and basic tenet of law of evidence. The petitioner has to blame himself for not ensuring that a witness, who is proposed to be examined by him, is not in the Court, when the other witness is being cross-examined.

Section 629-A of the Companies Act as accused violated sec.94(2) of Companies Act = No permission by resolution is necessary under Sec.32 32(1) of the SIC Act coupled with Clause (8) of Ex.D-2 BIFR order for increasing authorized capital from Rs.8 crores to Rs.10.50 crores =the respondents/A.1 to A.4 were found not guilty for the offence punishable under Section 629-A of the Companies Act, 1956 (for short, ‘the Act’), for the contravention of Section 94(2) of the Act and were acquitted. =A-1 company has increased its authorized capital from Rs.8 crores to Rs.10.50 crores without passing a resolution in General Body Meeting. Hence, it is contended that A-1 company has violated the provisions of Section 94 of the Act. = Section 32(1) of the SIC Act coupled with Clause (8) of Ex.D-2 order and as A-1 company increased authorized capital from Rs.8 crores to Rs.10.50 crores, as per BIFR order, the complainant is not justified in contending that the increase of the authorized capital is in violation of Section 94(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, since resolution was not passed by the general body in the general meeting. The action of A-1 to A-4 in increasing authorized capital of A-1 company without passing resolution of the general body in general meeting is saved by Section 32(1) of SIC Act, as A-1 to A-4 did so as per the directions of BIFR.

Boy leg was amputated - Tribunal awarded Rs.3,45,000/- against the appellants that is KSRTC and Insurance Company - Hired Bus - liability in the case of a hired bus.= But the issue with regard to hired bus is now authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court in Managing Director, KSRTC v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [1] holding that all are jointly and severally liable to the claim; but however, the Road Transport Corporation, in terms of the lease agreement entered into with the registered owner, would be entitled to recover the amount paid to the claimants from the owner as stipulated in the agreement or from the insurer. = In view of the decision in Managing Director, KSRTC’s case (supra), the award passed by the Tribunal has to be upheld. However, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation can recover the amount from the owner as stipulated in the agreement or from the insurer.

Sec.152 of C.P.C. - No appeal for correction of decree as per Judgement = Under the award it was held that that 2 nd respondent/insurance company is not liable and that the 1 st respondent/owner of the vehicle is alone liable to the pay the compensation awarded to the claimants. However, the contents of the decree granted would show that the liability is fastened against the insurance company as well. Therefore, the contents of the decree are quite contrary to the findings recorded in the award, where under and whereby the Tribunal had exonerated the insurance company from the liability to pay any compensation and fastened the liability on the 1 st respondent alone. = In the facts and circumstances of the case, instead of filing this appeal, the Insurance Company ought to have requested the Tribunal to correct the mistakes in the decree by exercising its powers under section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Section 366 read with 34 IPC =acquitted = PW.4 is the doctor, who examined PW.2 and issued certificate stating that she is aged about 18 years. The prosecution claims that PW.2 was forcibly abducted. In the cross examination, PW.2 admits that there was a love affair between her and accused No.1 and she was not confined in the house for five months. The admission of PW.2 that they witnessed movies, worked in the factory for two months, continued to live for five months clearly shows that there was no force on her and she was not confined. The evidence of PW.2 clearly shows that she voluntarily resided with accused No.1 for five months. In case of appeal against acquittal the scope of appeal is circumscribed by limitation. Unless the approach of lower Court to the consideration of evidence is vitiated by manifest illegality or conclusion arrived at by the lower Court is perverse, no interference with the order of acquittal is permissible.

a stray admission in his cross-examination does not hold water.= PW.2 made a stray admission in his cross-examination that the disputes commenced from the year 1970 onwards with D.1. Thus the claim of defendants is that ever since 1957 they were in possession of the suit property and therefore, in 1970 when Bhanumathi claimed property by virtue of her sale, the D.1 asserted his title and possession against her and in that view, the present suit which is filed long after, is barred by limitation. This argument does not hold water. PW.2 is the son of plaintiff. In his cross-examination no doubt he made some admissions. For instance, he deposed as if the suit property was in possession of plaintiff since 1970 when Bhanumathi handed over the possession. He also admitted that disputes commenced from the year 1970 onwards with D.1. He further admitted that D.1 used to come to the site and go away and he used to obstruct their entry into the site from the beginning. Now the point is whether these admissions would amount to establishment of adverse possession by the defendants. PW.2 was born in the year 1959 and he was 11 years old by 1970. In view of his tender age by 1970, it is difficult to believe his words that his mother obtained possession of suit property in 1970 itself. In contrast, plaintiff (PW.1) in her evidence stated that she obtained possession of the property one week after execution of Ex.A.5. Therefore, the evidence of PW.2 with regard to delivery of possession cannot be viewed seriously. Similarly his other admission that the disputes commenced from the year 1970 onwards with D.1 also cannot be taken seriously as by 1970, PW.2 was only a tender aged boy. Therefore, his evidence will not clinch the adverse possession. So none of the points raised by the appellants would clinchingly establish that defendants have enjoyed the suit property openly, continuously and against the right, title and interest of Bhanumathi and plaintiff beyond the statutory period of limitation. The appellate Court upon proper consideration of the facts and evidence rightly held that the plaintiff deserved decree in her favour and the said finding does not suffer any legal infirmity