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Sub-Registrar/Registering Authority under the A.P. Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 (for short “Act 1977”) objections to register a document under Section 22-A of the Act. - lands assigned prior to 1954 without the condition of non-alienability =The competent authority shall prepare the list of assigned lands with the condition of non-alienability and forward the list to Sub-Registrar/Registering Authority under the A.P. Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 (for short “Act 1977”). The petitioners who claim to have lands assigned prior to 1954 without the condition of non-alienability are given liberty to place details of assignment and decisions of this Court on the applicability of “Act 1977” to such assignment, for updating and operating the prohibitory list by these authorities under Section 22-A of the Act. - The respondent/Government having regard to a particular fact situation, if is desirous of including land assigned prior to 1954 in prohibitory list and claims interest in the property, the prohibition of such registration shall be by way of a notification under Section 22-A(1)(e) of the Act. It is open to the aggrieved party to assail such notification, if any, issued by the authority competent. It is made clear that refusal of registration by S.R.O in a given case results in fresh cause of action and the party aggrieved, by such rejection, is given liberty to pursue the legal remedies available to him/her in law.

WA 142 / 2016
WASR 175367 / 2014CASE IS:DISPOSEDPETITIONERRESPONDENTSRI VARAHA LAKSHMI NARASIMHA SWAMY TEMPLE, VISAKHAPATNAM.  VSSMT. JAMI BHAVANI @ BUJJI, VISAKHAPATNAM, & ANR.


SUBJECT: STAMPS & REGISTRATIONDISTRICT:  VISAKHAPATNAM


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT HYDERABAD FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AND THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
HON’BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE DILIP B. BHOSALE AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE S.V. BHATT
WRIT APPEAL Nos.142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158 and 159 0f 2016 Date: 12.02.2016 W.A.No.142 of 2016
Between: Sri Varaha Lakshmi Narasimha Swamy Temple, rep., by its Joint Commissioner & Executive Officer, Visakhapatnam District. … Appellant And Smt. Jami Bhavani @ Bujji & another. … Respondents
HON’BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE SRI DILIP B.BHOSALE AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE S.V.BHATT
WRIT APPEAL Nos. 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158 and 159 0f 2016 PC: (per th…

suit for declaration that he is the owner of the plaint schedule property and for recovery of possession of the property from the respondent by directing the respondent to remove the tin shed construction and two rooms therein by way of mandatory injunction. - basing on allotment letter by defendant society and basing on injunction decree - mere letter of allotment cannot confer title as it is not a registered sale deed - Trial court and Appellant court rightly dismissed the suit despite of the fact that the defendant remained exparte = It is settled law that in a suit filed for declaration of title and recovery of possession, burden of proof lies on the plaintiff and he must succeed on the strength of his own title (Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos Vs. Thukalan Paulo Avira and Ors. [1] and Union of India and Others Vs. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited and others [2] ). None of the documents filed by appellant establish his title to the plaint schedule property and admittedly the appellant has no registered sale deed executed by the above Society in his favour.

SA 38 / 2016
SASR 24256 / 2014CASE IS:DISPOSEDPETITIONERRESPONDENTV SARVESHAM  VSCHILUKU CHANDRAIAH
RESP.ADV. : SUBJECT: DECLARATION OF TITLE(IMMOVABLE PROPERTY)DISTRICT:  WARANGAL


THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO
SECOND APPEAL No.38 of 2016
JUDGMENT:
This Second Appeal is preferred by the appellant challenging the judgment and decree dt.17-04-2014 in A.S.No.95 of 2012 of the Principal District Judge, Warangal confirming the judgment and decree dt.18-07- 2012 in O.S.No.646 of 2010 of the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Warangal. 
2. The appellant herein is plaintiff in the suit.He filed the said suit for declaration that he is the owner of the plaint schedule property and for recovery of possession of the property from the respondent by directing the respondent to remove the tin shed construction and two rooms therein by way of mandatory injunction.
3. According to the appellant, a plot No.68 admeasuring 402 sq. yards out of Sy.Nos.232 and 234 at Lashkarsingaram village o …

rehabilitation scheme - the allotment proceedings did not contain any prohibition on alienation of the property.trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the respondent. The appellate court confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court, - held that there is no wrong to interfere - Dismissed the appeal

SA 185 / 2016
SASR 45113 / 2010CASE IS:DISPOSEDPETITIONERRESPONDENTMAMIDI ESWARAMMA  VSYELLAPU MAHESWARARAO






--------

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY
SECOND APPEAL NO.185 OF 2016
DATED:10-06-2016
Between: Mamidi Eswaramma … Appellant
And Yellapu Maheswararao … Respondent
COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT: Dr. P.B. Vijaya Kumar
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr. T.D. Phani Kumar
THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING: JUDGMENT:
This second appeal arises out of concurrent findings of the Courts below.
The admitted facts of the case are that the mother of the appellant was allotted the suit schedule property under a rehabilitation scheme. She has sold the same for a valuable consideration under a registered sale deed in favour of the respondent.
As the appellant was interfering with the possession and occupation of the respondent, the latter has filed O.S. No.494 of 2005 on the file of the Junior Civil Judge, Gajuwaka, for permanent injunction. 
The trial Court framed the following issues.
1. “Wheth…

Whether the order of the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation & Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Ranga Reddy is legal, proper and correct in respect of granting interest ? The next objection of insurance company is that the lower authority has granted interest, though Workmen’s Compensation Act does not provide any provision for payment of interest. But as seen from the order of lower authority it granted interest by relying on judgment of the Supreme Court. Both sides have not disputed the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions referred to in the order of lower authority, therefore, objection of insurance company with regard to interest is also not tenable.

CMA 313 / 2016
CMASR 13157 / 2011CASE IS:DISPOSEDPETITIONERRESPONDENTRELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, VISAKHAPATNAM.  VSUDHAV AND 2 OTHERS


SUBJECT: W.C.ACT & E.S.I. ACT(DEATH)DISTRICT:  HYDERABAD








HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE S. RAVI KUMAR
CMA No.313 of 2016
JUDGMENT:
This appeal is filed with delay condonation petition. On the request of both sides after condoning the delay appeal is taken up as the main objection raised in the appeal is already covered. This appeal is preferred questioning the order dated 25.01.2011 in W.C.No.5 of 2008 (old WC No.11 of 2007) on the file of Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation and Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Ranga Reddy. 
2. Respondents No.2 and 3 herein submitted application before the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation (for short “lower authority”) contending that on 30.03.2007, the deceased Mahesh while traveling on DCM lorry bearing No. AP 29U 3148 as cleaner the vehicle met with an accident at about 11.00 a.m., due to which, dec…

the appeal is dismissed for non-compliance of the order by nor furnishing correct address of accuse = The Public Prosecutor is not able to say as to whether they could furnish the correct address of the accused. Having regard to the same and as the accused is already convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years for the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC, the appeal is dismissed for non-compliance of the order dated 27.01.2015. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed

CRLA 428 / 2016CRLASR 22325 / 2007CASE IS:DISPOSEDPETITIONERRESPONDENTTHE STATE OF A.P.  VSGUNTU RAJU @ JOHN


SUBJECT: U/s.376 I.P.C Acquittal - RapeDISTRICT:  EAST GODAVARI

DISPOSED ON  04-04-2016 DISMISSED
---------

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C. PRAVEEN KUMAR
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.428 of 2016
JUDGMENT:
This Criminal Appeal is filed under Section 378 (3) & (c) Cr.P.C. by the State, challenging the judgment dated 23.09.2006 passed in S.C.No.194 of 2006 on the file of the II Additional Assistant Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), East Godavari, Rajahmundry, seeking enhancement of sentence awarded to the accused.
For the sake of convenience, the parties will hereinafter be referred to as arrayed in S.C. The facts in issue are as under: On 12.11.2005 at about 8.00 p.m. PW.1 after providing dinner to her husband and mother, PW.1 went to the back side of her house and removed her cloths for taking bath behind a fence. At that time, accused, who is passing by the side of the house, with an evil desir…

eschewed the evidence in chief of D.W.3 and held that he shall not be entitled to depose as a witness in that suit as he was present through out the cross examination of DW2 =If a party to a suit intends to examine more witnesses than one, the basic requirement is that when one of the witnesses is being examined, others who are proposed to be examined as witnesses, are not present in the Court. If they are present, they would naturally become alert and fill the lacunae, that may be left in the evidence of the person, who is already examined as a witness. The Law does not permit this. However, exactly the same thing has happened in the instant case. When the cross-examination of D.W.2 was in progress, a person who is proposed to be examined as D.W.3, was present in the Court through out. The trial Court has taken correct view of the matter, when it held that the evidence of D.W.3 cannot be recorded at all and that the affidavit filed by him in lieu of chief-examination is liable to be eschewed from consideration. If at all anything, the trial Court has only enforced a fundamental principle and basic tenet of law of evidence. The petitioner has to blame himself for not ensuring that a witness, who is proposed to be examined by him, is not in the Court, when the other witness is being cross-examined.

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY        

Civil Revision Petition No.253 of 2013

08.02.2013

M.Venkataratnam Reddy.  

P.L.Manogaran and others.

Counsel for the petitioner    : Sri Suresh Kumar Reddy Kalava

Counsel for respondent : ---

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

?Cases referred:

ORDER:
        The 1st respondent filed O.S.No.104 of 2007 in the Court of Senior Civil
Judge, Puttur against the petitioner and respondents 2 to 7 herein, for the
relief of perpetual injunction in respect of the suit schedule property. The
trial of the suit commenced.  The evidence on behalf of the 1st respondent was
concluded. The evidence on behalf of the defendants is in progress.  The cross-
examination of D.W.1 was also completed.      
        When D.W.2 was being cross-examined, a person who was sought to be  
examined as D.W.3 and filed affidavit in lieu of Chief-examination, remained in
the Court.  Taking that into account, the trial Court, through docket order,
dated 14.12.2012, esch…

Section 629-A of the Companies Act as accused violated sec.94(2) of Companies Act = No permission by resolution is necessary under Sec.32 32(1) of the SIC Act coupled with Clause (8) of Ex.D-2 BIFR order for increasing authorized capital from Rs.8 crores to Rs.10.50 crores =the respondents/A.1 to A.4 were found not guilty for the offence punishable under Section 629-A of the Companies Act, 1956 (for short, ‘the Act’), for the contravention of Section 94(2) of the Act and were acquitted. =A-1 company has increased its authorized capital from Rs.8 crores to Rs.10.50 crores without passing a resolution in General Body Meeting. Hence, it is contended that A-1 company has violated the provisions of Section 94 of the Act. = Section 32(1) of the SIC Act coupled with Clause (8) of Ex.D-2 order and as A-1 company increased authorized capital from Rs.8 crores to Rs.10.50 crores, as per BIFR order, the complainant is not justified in contending that the increase of the authorized capital is in violation of Section 94(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, since resolution was not passed by the general body in the general meeting. The action of A-1 to A-4 in increasing authorized capital of A-1 company without passing resolution of the general body in general meeting is saved by Section 32(1) of SIC Act, as A-1 to A-4 did so as per the directions of BIFR.

CRLA 412 / 2016
CRLASR 20033 / 2008CASE IS:DISPOSEDPETITIONERRESPONDENTREGISTRAR OF COMPANIES  VSM/S. S.S.ORGANICS LTD. & 4 OTHERS




DISPOSED ON  06-04-2016 DISMISSED

STATUS   :  ---------

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.PRAVEEN KUMAR
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.412 of 2016
JUDGMENT:
Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned counsel for respondents 1 to 4 and the learned Public Prosecutor for the 5 th respondent. With the consent of the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned counsel for the respondents, the criminal appeal is disposed of at the admission stage.
2. This Criminal Appeal is filed under Section 378 (4) read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, "Cr.P.C."), questioning the correctness of the order, dated 13.07.2007, passed in C.C.No.05 of 2006, on the file of the Special Judge for Economic Offences at Hyderabad, whereunder the respondents/A.1 to A.4 were found not guilty for the offence punishable under Section …

Boy leg was amputated - Tribunal awarded Rs.3,45,000/- against the appellants that is KSRTC and Insurance Company - Hired Bus - liability in the case of a hired bus.= But the issue with regard to hired bus is now authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court in Managing Director, KSRTC v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [1] holding that all are jointly and severally liable to the claim; but however, the Road Transport Corporation, in terms of the lease agreement entered into with the registered owner, would be entitled to recover the amount paid to the claimants from the owner as stipulated in the agreement or from the insurer. = In view of the decision in Managing Director, KSRTC’s case (supra), the award passed by the Tribunal has to be upheld. However, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation can recover the amount from the owner as stipulated in the agreement or from the insurer.

MACMA 418 / 2016
MACMASR 39825 / 2008CASE IS:DISPOSEDPETITIONERRESPONDENTTHE NORTH WEST KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION  VSS.MASTHAN VALI & 2 ORS




DISPOSED ON  11-02-2016 DISMISSED NO COSTS

STATUS   :  ---------


THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.RAMALINGESWARA RAO
MACMA.Nos.417 and 418 of 2016
COMMON JUDGMENT:
These two appeals are being disposed of by this common order, as they arise out of award dated 05.03.2008 in M.V.O.P.No.463 of 2006 on the file of the Court of the Special Judge for SC/ST (POA) Act-cum-VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kurnool-cum-Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kurnool (for short, the Tribunal).
2. MACMA.No.417 of 2016 was filed by Oriental Insurance Company, whereas MACMA.No.418 of 2016 was filed by North West Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation. Both the appeals raise a common point with regard to their liability in the case of a hired bus. But the issue with regard to hired bus is now authoritatively settled by the Supreme C…

Sec.152 of C.P.C. - No appeal for correction of decree as per Judgement = Under the award it was held that that 2 nd respondent/insurance company is not liable and that the 1 st respondent/owner of the vehicle is alone liable to the pay the compensation awarded to the claimants. However, the contents of the decree granted would show that the liability is fastened against the insurance company as well. Therefore, the contents of the decree are quite contrary to the findings recorded in the award, where under and whereby the Tribunal had exonerated the insurance company from the liability to pay any compensation and fastened the liability on the 1 st respondent alone. = In the facts and circumstances of the case, instead of filing this appeal, the Insurance Company ought to have requested the Tribunal to correct the mistakes in the decree by exercising its powers under section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

MACMA 1370 / 2016
MACMASR 27858 / 2006CASE IS:DISPOSEDPETITIONERRESPONDENTTHE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, HYDERABAD.  VSSMT. JATAVATH GAMSI AND 2 OTHERS




DISPOSED ON  31-03-2016 DISPOSED OF NO COSTS

STATUS   :  ---------



THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.SEETHARAMA MURTI
MACMA.No.1370 of 2016
JUDGMENT: The New India Assurance Company Limited/the 2 nd respondent in OP no.746 of 2003 on the file of the learned Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-XXIII Additional Chief Judge, Red Hills, Nampally, Hyderabad had filed this civil miscellaneous appeal assailing the decree dated 09.09.2005 of the said learned Chairman passed in the aforementioned OP.
2. I have heard the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant/Insurance company (‘the insurance company’, for brevity) and the learned counsel for the 1 st respondent/1 st claimant. The 2 nd respondent had died; and, for not bringing on record the legal representatives of the deceased 2 nd respondent, the appeal against the 2 nd…

Section 366 read with 34 IPC =acquitted = PW.4 is the doctor, who examined PW.2 and issued certificate stating that she is aged about 18 years. The prosecution claims that PW.2 was forcibly abducted. In the cross examination, PW.2 admits that there was a love affair between her and accused No.1 and she was not confined in the house for five months. The admission of PW.2 that they witnessed movies, worked in the factory for two months, continued to live for five months clearly shows that there was no force on her and she was not confined. The evidence of PW.2 clearly shows that she voluntarily resided with accused No.1 for five months. In case of appeal against acquittal the scope of appeal is circumscribed by limitation. Unless the approach of lower Court to the consideration of evidence is vitiated by manifest illegality or conclusion arrived at by the lower Court is perverse, no interference with the order of acquittal is permissible.

CRLA 442 / 2016
CRLASR 24011 / 2007CASE IS:DISPOSEDPETITIONERRESPONDENTTHE STATE OF A.P., REP BY PP.,  VSPASAGADUGALA KISHORE AND 3 OTHERS,






DISPOSED ON  04-04-2016 DISMISSED

STATUS   :  ---------HON'BLE JUDGE(S):C.PRAVEEN KUMAR   


HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C. PRAVEEN KUMAR
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 442 of 2016 JUDGMENT:
This Criminal Appeal is filed under Section 378 (3) and (1) Cr.P.C. by the State, challenging the judgment dated 18.05.2006 passed in S.C.No.366 of 2004 on the file of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Ramachandrapuram, wherein the accused were acquitted for the offences punishable under Sections 366 read with 34 IPC.
For the sake of convenience, the parties will hereinafter be referred to as arrayed in S.C. The facts in issue are as under: On 17.10.2003 at about 7.00 p.m. while the victim girl was going to tuition, one white colour ambassador car came there; her cousin-accused No.2 asked her to board the car stating that he will drop in the tuition and forcibly made her to board the…

a stray admission in his cross-examination does not hold water.= PW.2 made a stray admission in his cross-examination that the disputes commenced from the year 1970 onwards with D.1. Thus the claim of defendants is that ever since 1957 they were in possession of the suit property and therefore, in 1970 when Bhanumathi claimed property by virtue of her sale, the D.1 asserted his title and possession against her and in that view, the present suit which is filed long after, is barred by limitation. This argument does not hold water. PW.2 is the son of plaintiff. In his cross-examination no doubt he made some admissions. For instance, he deposed as if the suit property was in possession of plaintiff since 1970 when Bhanumathi handed over the possession. He also admitted that disputes commenced from the year 1970 onwards with D.1. He further admitted that D.1 used to come to the site and go away and he used to obstruct their entry into the site from the beginning. Now the point is whether these admissions would amount to establishment of adverse possession by the defendants. PW.2 was born in the year 1959 and he was 11 years old by 1970. In view of his tender age by 1970, it is difficult to believe his words that his mother obtained possession of suit property in 1970 itself. In contrast, plaintiff (PW.1) in her evidence stated that she obtained possession of the property one week after execution of Ex.A.5. Therefore, the evidence of PW.2 with regard to delivery of possession cannot be viewed seriously. Similarly his other admission that the disputes commenced from the year 1970 onwards with D.1 also cannot be taken seriously as by 1970, PW.2 was only a tender aged boy. Therefore, his evidence will not clinch the adverse possession. So none of the points raised by the appellants would clinchingly establish that defendants have enjoyed the suit property openly, continuously and against the right, title and interest of Bhanumathi and plaintiff beyond the statutory period of limitation. The appellate Court upon proper consideration of the facts and evidence rightly held that the plaintiff deserved decree in her favour and the said finding does not suffer any legal infirmity

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE U. DURGA PRASAD RAO          

S.A. No.362 of 2003

29-03-2016

Koppisetty Ramana and others.. Appellants

Emani Ramanamma.. Respondent    

Counsel for Appellants: Smt. Bobba Vijayalakshmi

Counsel for Respondent:Sri V.L.N.Gopala Krishna Murthy

<Gist:

>Head Note:

? Cases referred:
1)      (1990) 4 SCC 706
2)      1998 (4) ALT 469 (DB)
3)      (2000) 3 SCC 640
4)      (2000) 7 SCC 60
5)      (2002) 5 SCC 90
6)      (2003) 4 SCC 161
7)      (2004) 1 SCC 271
8)      (2006) 7 SCC 570
9)      (2007) 6 SCC 59
10)      AIR 1995 SC 895
11)      (2007) 3 SCC 114
12)     AIR 2005 SC 4407

HONBLE SRI JUSTICE U. DURGA PRASAD RAO        

SECOND APPEAL No.362 of 2003    

JUDGMENT:  
        This Second Appeal is filed by the defendants questioning the
judgment and decree dated 14.02.2003 in A.S.No.194 of 1997 passed by
the VII Additional District Judge, Kakinada wherein the learned Judge
allowed the appeal filed by the appellant/plaintiff and set aside the
judgment and…