A divorced Muslim woman is entitled for maintenance during the iddat period in view of Section 3 (i) (a) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE T. SUNIL CHOWDARY
CRL.P.No.6645 OF 2010
28-03-2016
S.Rehana Sulthana @ Rehana Begum ...Petitioner
B.Mohammad Ghouse & Another...Respondent
Counsel for Petitioner : Sri K.V.Subba Reddy
Counsel for the respondent: Sri M. Bhaskar
<GIST:
>HEAD NOTE:
?Cases referred
1 2003 (1) ALT (Cri.) 369
2 (2002) 7 SCC 518
3 (2007) 6 SCC 555
4 (2008) 13 SCC 689
5 (2011) 12 SCC 347
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE T. SUNIL CHOWDARY
CRIMINAL PETITION No.6645 OF 2010
ORDER:
1 This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking
to quash the order dated 08.06.2009 passed in Crl.R.P.No.110 of
2007 by the learned Principal District & Sessions Judge, Ananthapur,
wherein and whereby the order dated 22.10.2007 passed by the
learned Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Ananthapur in M.C.No.38 of
2006 was confirmed.
2 The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the
Courts below misconstrued the scope of Sub-Section 4 of Section 125
Cr.P.C. and dismissed the petition. He would further submit that the
Courts below failed to appreciate that the petitioner left the
matrimonial home because of the harassment meted out by the
respondent and his family members. It is his further submission that
the Courts below failed to appreciate that Talaqnama dated
14.09.2006 has no legal sanctity for non-following the procedure
contemplated under Mahomedan Law. He further submitted that the
findings of the courts below are perverse as the same are not based
on any material. He further submitted that no notice was served on
the petitioner intimating the pronouncement of Talaq by the
respondent.
3 Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted
that this Court shall not lightly interfere with the concurrent findings
of fact recorded by the Courts below. He further submitted that the
findings recorded by the Courts below are supported by oral and
documentary evidence more so legally admissible evidence. He
further submitted that it is not a fit case to quash the impugned order
by invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482
Cr.P.C.
4 The facts of the case that led to the filing of the present petition
are succinctly as follows:
5 The petitioner filed a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C.
claiming maintenance of Rs.6,000/- p.m. from the respondent inter
alia stating that her marriage with the respondent was performed on
22.01.2006 as per Muslim rites and caste customs. As per the
allegations made in the petition, the parents of the petitioner gave
Rs.2.00 lakhs of cash and 12 tulas of gold to the respondent at the
time of marriage towards dowry. Immediately after the marriage, she
joined the respondent to lead marital life. The respondent and his
family members subjected her to cruelty and hence she lodged
complaint with the Station House Officer, Mahila Police station,
Ananthapur, who in turn registered a case in Cr.No.26 of 2006 under
Section 498-A of IPC. Two months prior to the filing of the petition for
maintenance the respondent necked out the petitioner from
matrimonial home without honouring the advice of the elders. Several
panchayats held to settle the dispute between the parties but in vain.
The respondent is a government employee and getting salary of
Rs.10,000/- per month. Hence the petition.
6 The respondent filed counter admitting the factum of marriage,
inter alia, contending that the petitioner stayed in the house of the
respondent for a period of ten days only. The petitioner insisted the
respondent for setting up of separate family for which the respondent
refused. Therefore, the petitioner left the house of the respondent. On
06.05.2006 the respondent got issued a notice to the petitioner
requesting her to join with him. On 18.5.2006 the petitioner executed
an agreement in the presence of the elders agreeing that she will not
insist for separate family and join with him. On 14.8.2006 the
petitioner lodged a false complaint to the Station House Officer,
Mahila Police station, Ananthapur who in turn registered it as a case
in Cr.No.26 of 2006 against the respondent and his family members
for the offence under Section 498-A of IPC. Having no other
alternative, the respondent pronounced Talaq in the presence of
elders on 14.09.2006 and sent notice to the petitioner informing
pronouncement of talaq along with demand drafts, which was
returned as unserved. The petitioner is a divorced woman and hence
she is not entitled to claim maintenance from the respondent. The
petitioner has been working as Hindi Pandit in Vivekananda High
School, Gooti and getting salary of Rs.3,000/-p.m. The respondent is
working as Lineman in A.P.TRANSCO and getting salary of Rs.4,000/-
p.m. Hence the petition may be dismissed.
7 Before the trial Court on behalf of the petitioner P.Ws.1 and 2
were examined but no document was marked. On behalf of the
respondent R.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.R.1 to R.17 were
marked.
8 The trial Court after having thoughtful consideration to the oral
and documentary evidence available on record, arrived at a
conclusion that the petitioner herself left the matrimonial home
without any justifiable reason. The trial Court further observed that
the petitioner is a divorced woman, therefore, she is not entitled to
claim maintenance from the respondent and dismissed the petition.
9 Feeling aggrieved by the order of dismissal dated 22.10.2007
passed by the trial Court in M.C.No.38 of 2006, the petitioner
preferred Crl.R.P.No.110 of 2007 before the learned Principal District
& Sessions Judge, Ananthapur. The learned Principal District &
Sessions Judge, Ananthapur after reappraising the material available
on record, fully endorsed the findings recorded by the trial Court and
dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition. Hence the present Criminal
Petition.
10 Now the points that arise for consideration in this Criminal
Petition are:
i. Whether the petitioner is entitled to claim
maintenance from the respondent?
2. Whether the findings recorded by the trial
Court are perverse, warranting interference
of this Court?
POINT Nos.1 & 2:
11 Both the points are intertwined with each other and hence I am
inclined to address these two points simultaneously in order to avoid
recapitulation of facts and evidence.
12 The chronological dates and events may throw some light on
the real controversy. The marriage of the petitioner was performed
with respondent on 22.01.2006 as per Muslim rites and caste
customs. In the presence of elders the petitioner and the respondent
entered into an agreement on 18.05.2006 in order to lead peaceful
and happy married life. Be that as it may, unfortunately bad weather
prevailed in the family life of the petitioner and respondent within no
time from the date of marriage. Basing on the complaint lodged by
the petitioner, the Station House Officer, Mahila Police station,
Ananthapur registered a case in Cr.No.26 of 2006 under Section 498-
A of IPC against the respondent and his family members on
14.8.2006. On 22.08.2006 the petitioner filed the petition before the
trial Court.
13 In order to claim maintenance, the petitioner has to satisfy the
ingredients of Sub-Sections (1) & (4) of Section 125 Cr.P.C. which
read as follows:
125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents: (1) If any
person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain:
a) his wife, unable to maintain herself; or
b) his legitimate or negligence minor child, whether married or not,
unable to maintain itself; or
c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter)
who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any
physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself; or
d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself,
Sub-Section (4) of Section 125 Cr.P.C.
No wife shall be entitled to receive an (allowance for the
maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding,
as the case may be) from her husband under this Section if she is
living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to
live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual
consent.
(Underlined by me)
14 A fascicular reading of the above two provisions clearly
demonstrates that if the husband wilfully and intentionally neglects to
provide maintenance to his wife, then she can approach the Court
seeking maintenance. At the same time, wife is not entitled to claim
maintenance from her husband if she left the matrimonial home
without any cause much less justifiable cause.
15 To substantiate the case, the petitioner examined herself as
P.W.1. Her father was examined as P.W.2. To demolish the case of
the petitioner, the respondent examined himself as R.W.1 and got
marked Exs.R.1 to R.17. R.W.2 was examined to prove
pronouncement of Talaq. The petitioner knocked the doors of the
Court on 22.08.2006 seeking maintenance from the respondent as
she is unable to maintain herself. The underlying object of Section
125 Cr.P.C. is to wipe off the tears of the destitute wife and the
children who were mercilessly thrown out of the matrimonial home,
for no fault of them.
16 As per the testimony of P.W.1, the respondent and his family
members subjected her to cruelty and hence she left the matrimonial
home on 12.08.2006. As per the testimony of R.W.1, the petitioner
stayed with him for hardly ten days and left the house on the ground
that he did not heed her request to set up separate family. The
respondent got issued legal notice on 06.05.2006 (Ex.R.4 is the office
copy of the legal notice) requesting the petitioner to join with him to
lead marital life. Ex.R.6 is the acknowledgement. Whatever deposed
by R.W.1 is reflecting in Ex.R.4 legal notice. For one reason or the
other the petitioner did not choose to issue reply to Ex.R.4. If rally
the respondent and his family members subjected the petitioner to
cruelty what prevented her to give a befitting reply narrating the
alleged torture being undergone by her at her in-laws home? In the
cross examination P.W.1 in unequivocal terms deposed that she
executed an agreement Ex.R.7 in the presence of elders with an
undertaking that she will not insist the respondent for setting up
separate family. If really the petitioner did not pester the respondent
persistently to set up separate family, what made her to subscribe her
signature on Ex.R.7 agreement? The Court shall not lose sight of the
human conduct while appreciating the rival contentions of the parties
to the proceedings, more particularly in family matters, wherein the
possibility of distortion of facts by the parties to the proceedings in
order to gain sympathy of the court cannot be ruled out completely. If
really the petitioner has suffered in the hands of the respondent and
his family members, certainly she might have availed the opportunity
of issuing a befitting reply to the legal notice (Ex.R.4) issued by the
respondent or she might have exposed the alleged misdeeds of the
family of the respondent in the presence of the elders on 18.05.2006.
This Court is very much conscious that non-issuance of reply by the
petitioner itself is not a sufficient ground to draw adverse inference
against her without considering the other attending circumstances.
Within three months from the date of panchayat the petitioner lodged
complaint against the respondent and his family members for the
offence under section 498-A of IPC. Though the petitioner is resident
of Gooti, for the reasons best known to her she lodged the complaint
on the file of Station House Officer, Mahila Police Station,
Ananthapur.
17 Establishment of the ingredients of Section 125 Cr.P.C. is sine
qua non for granting of maintenance. In the instant case, the
petitioner failed to prove that she left the matrimonial home because
of the harassment meted out by the respondent and his family
members.
18 The material available on record clearly establishes that the
petitioner herself left the matrimonial home without any justifiable
reason which disentitled her to claim maintenance under Section 125
Cr.P.C. I am fully endorsing the findings recorded by the courts
below on this aspect.
19 The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
respondent has not followed the procedure as contemplated under the
Mahomedan Law either at the time of pronouncement talaq or with
regard to the proper communication of the talaqnama to the
petitioner, therefore, the talaq alleged to have been pronounced by the
respondent does not withstand judicial scrutiny. Therefore, the
petitioner is entitled to claim maintenance from the respondent under
Section 125 Cr.P.C. In this case, it has to be seen whether the
pronouncement of talaq by the respondent and communication of the
talaqnama are not in accordance with the procedure contemplated
under Mahomedan Law; and if it is so, the petitioner is entitled to
claim maintenance from the respondent.
20 Chapter XVI of Mullas Mahomedan Law, Nineteenth Edition,
describes divorce. Section 307 deals with different forms of divorce,
which reads as under:
The contract of marriage under the Mahomedan Law will be
dissolved in any one of the following ways: (1) by the husband at his
will, without the intervention of a Court; (2) by mutual consent of the
husband and wife, without the intervention of a Court; (3) by a
judicial decree at the suit of the husband or wife. The wife cannot
divorce herself from her husband without his consent, except under a
contract whether made before or after marriage, but she may, in some
cases. Obtain a divorce by judicial decree.
When the divorce proceeds from the husband, it is called
talaq; when it is effected by mutual consent, it is called khula or
mubara at according to the terms of the contract between the parties.
21 Section 308 deals with divorce by talaq, which reads as under:
Any Mahomedan of sound mind, who has attained puberty,
may divorce his wife whenever he desires without assigning any
cause.
22 As per Section 310, talaq may be oral or in writing. A
Talaqnama may only be the record of the fact of pronouncement of
talaq or it may be the deed by which the divorce is effected. The deed
may be executed in the presence of the Kazi or of the wifes father or
of other witnesses. The deed is said to be in the customary form if it
is properly superscribed and addressed so as to show the name of the
writer and the person addressed.
23 In Zamrud Begum Vs. K.Md.Haneef this Court held as follows:
16. I am of the considered view that the alleged
talaq is not a valid talaq as it is not in accordance with
the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. If
there is no valid talaq the relationship of the wife with
her husband still continues and she cannot be treated
as a divorced wife. She can be treated as only a
deserted wife.
24 In Shamim Ara Vs. State of U.P the Honble Honble apex
Court held as follows:
13. There is yet another illuminating and weighty judicial opinion
available in two decisions of the Gauhati High Court recorded by
Baharul Islam, J. (later a Judge of the Supreme Court of India) sitting
singly in Jiauddin Ahmed v. Anwara Begum {(1981) 1 Gau LR 358}
and later speaking for the Division Bench in Rukia Khatun v. Abdul
Khalique Laskar {(1981) 1 Gau LR 375}. In Jiauddin Ahmed case a
plea of previous divorce i.e. the husband having divorced the wife on
some day much previous to the date of filing of the written statement
in the Court was taken and upheld. The question posed before the
High Court was whether there has been valid talaq of the wife by the
husband under the Muslim law. The learned Judge observed that
though marriage under the Muslim law is only a civil contract yet the
rights and responsibilities consequent upon it are of such importance
to the welfare of humanity, that a high degree of sanctity is attached
to it. But in spite of the sacredness of the character of the marriage
tie, Islam recognizes the necessity, in exceptional circumstances, of
keeping the way open for its dissolution (para 6). Quoting in the
judgment several Holy Quranic verses and from commentaries
thereon by well-recognized scholars of great eminence, the learned
Judge expressed disapproval of the statement that the whimsical
and capricious divorce by the husband is good in law, though bad in
theology and observed that such a statement is based on the concept
that women were chattel belonging to men, which the Holy Quran
does not brook. The correct law of talaq as ordained by the Holy
Quran is that talaq must be for a reasonable cause and be preceded
by attempts at reconciliation between the husband and the wife by
two arbiters one from the wifes family and the other from the
husbands; if the attempts fail, talaq may be effected (para 13). In
Rukia Khatun case, the Division Bench stated that the correct law of
talaq, as ordained by the Holy Quran, is: (i) that talaq must be for a
reasonable cause; and (ii) that it must be preceded by an attempt of
reconciliation between the husband and the wife by two arbiters, one
chosen by the wife from her family and the other by the husband
from his. If their attempts fail, talaq may be effected. The Division
Bench expressly recorded its dissent from the Calcutta and Bombay
views which, in their opinion, did not lay down the correct law.
25 Let me consider the facts of the case on hand on touchstone
with the provisions of Mahomedan Law and also in the light of the
principle enunciated by this Court and the Honble apex Court in the
cases cited supra.
26 As per the testimony of R.W.2, at the request of R.W.1 and his
family members they approached the petitioner and requested her
family members to come to the mosque at Gooti for settlement of the
dispute between the couple on 14.09.2006. His testimony further
reveals that on 14.09.2006 neither the petitioner nor her parents
appeared before the Kazi in order to resolve the dispute. As per the
testimony of R.W.1 on 14.09.2006 he pronounced talaq before the
Kazi in the presence of R.W.2, Abdul Rehman and Ibrahim. Even as
per the testimony of R.W.2, R.W.1 pronounced talaq in the presence
of Kazi and himself. In the cross-examination of R.Ws.1 and 2
nothing is elicited to shake their testimony so far as pronouncement
of talaq by R.W.1 on 14.09.2006 is concerned. The testimony of R.W.2
clearly reveals that Ex.R.8 Talaqnama bears his signature.
27 Before pronouncement of talaq, the respondent invited the
petitioner and her family members to come to the mosque on
14.09.2006 to resolve the dispute between them. For one reason or
the other, neither the petitioner nor her parents turn up to the said
panchayat. The respondent has taken a specific stand that he
requested the petitioner and her parents to attend the panchayat to
be held on 14.09.2006 in the mosque at Gooti. It is not elicited in
the cross examination of R.W.1 that he did not invite the family
members of the petitioner to the mosque on 14.09.2006. The material
placed before the trail Court clinchingly establishes that the
respondent made every attempt for reconciliation prior to the
pronouncement of talaq with a fond hope that the petitioner may join
him to lead happy marital life. The attempt of the respondent for
reconciliation in the presence of elders and Kazi also went in vain.
28 Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and
also the principle enunciated in the cases cited supra, I am of the
considered view that the respondent has strictly adhered to the
procedure as contemplated under the Mahomedan Law in order to
give effect to the talaq.
29 Under Mahomedan Law, the talaq pronounced by the husband
will come to effect from the date it was communicated to the wife. As
per the testimony of R.W.1 immediately after pronouncing talaq, he
communicated the same to the petitioner by registered post with
acknowledgement due. Exs.R.2 and R.3 are the un-served envelopes.
As per the endorsement made on Exs.R.2 and R.3, the petitioner was
continuously absent for seven days. On the same day i.e. 14.09.2006
the respondent also got issued a notice to the petitioner intimating
the pronouncement of talaq. Ex.R.9 is the office copy of the notice and
Ex.R.10 is the acknowledgement. A perusal of the record reveals that
the respondent sent copy of the talaqnama Ex.R.11 to Ashraf of Asrar
mosque in order to comply with the religious requirement.
30 The respondent sent Exs.R.2 and R.3 to the address where the
petitioner has been ordinarily residing with her parents. In the cross
examination P.W.1 in unequivocal terms deposed that she has been
residing in the address to which Exs.R.2 and R.3 were sent. The
crucial question for determination is whether the Courts below were
justified in drawing a presumption that notice was served on the
petitioner or not?
31 In C.C.Alavi Haji Vs. Palapetty Muhammed the Honble
Honble apex Court held as follows:
13. According to Section 114 of the Act, read with Illustration (f)
thereunder, when it appears to the court that the common course of
business renders it probable that a thing would happen, the court
may draw presumption that the thing would have happened, unless
there are circumstances in a particular case to show that the common
course of business was not followed. Thus, Section 114 enables the
court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to
have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural
events, human conduct and public and private business in their
relation to the facts of the particular case. Consequently, the court
can presume that the common course of business has been followed
in particular cases. When applied to communications sent by post,
Section 114 enables the court to presume that in the common course
of natural events, the communication would have been delivered at
the address of the addressee. But the presumption that is raised
under Section 27 of the GC Act is a far stronger presumption.
Further, while Section 114 of the Evidence Act refers to a general
presumption, Section 27 refers to a specific presumption. For the sake
of ready reference, Section 27 of the GC Act is extracted below:
27. Meaning of service by post.Where any Central Act or
Regulation made after the commencement of this Act
authorises or requires any document to be served by post,
whether the expression serve or either of the expression give
or send or any other expression is used, then, unless a
different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be
effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by
registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless
the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at
which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of
post.
14. Section 27 gives rise to a presumption that service of notice
has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered
post. In view of the said presumption, when stating that a notice has
been sent by registered post to the address of the drawer, it is
unnecessary to further aver in the complaint that in spite of the
return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that
the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless and
until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is
deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would
have been delivered in the ordinary course of business. This Court
has already held that when a notice is sent by registered post and is
returned with a postal endorsement refused or not available in the
house or house locked or shop closed or addressee not in
station, due service has to be presumed. (Vide Jagdish Singh v.
Natthu Singh {(1992) 1 SCC 647} State of M.P. v. Hiralal {(1996) 7 SCC
523} and V. Raja Kumari v. P. Subbarama Naidu {(2004) 8 SCC 774}.
It is, therefore, manifest that in view of the presumption available
under Section 27 of the Act, it is not necessary to aver in the
complaint under Section 138 of the Act that service of notice was
evaded by the accused or that the accused had a role to play in the
return of the notice unserved.
32 In Subodh S.Salaskar Vs. Jayprakash M. Shah the Honble
Honble apex Court held as follows:
24. Presumption of service, under the statute, would arise
not only when it is sent by registered post in terms of Section
27 of the General Clauses Act but such a presumption may be
raised also under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. Even when
a notice is received back with an endorsement that the party
has refused to accept, still then a presumption can be raised as
regards the valid service of notice. Such a notice, as has been
held by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in C.C. Alavi Haji v.
Palapetty Muhammed {(2007) 6 SCC 555} should be construed
liberally.
33 As per the principle enunciated in the cases cited supra, the
Court can draw a presumption that the notice was served on the
party to the proceedings if the same was sent by registered post with
acknowledgement due to the address where he or she ordinarily
resides unless and until the contrary is proved. It is not the case of
the petitioner that at the relevant point of time, she was not residing
in the address as mentioned on Ex.R.2 and R.3 envelopes. Having
regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and also the
principle enunciated in the cases cited supra, I am of the considered
view that the notice was served on the petitioner.
34 A divorced Muslim woman is entitled for maintenance during
the iddat period in view of Section 3 (i) (a) of the Muslim Women
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. As seen from the
testimony of R.W.1 he obtained demand draft for Rs.5,215/- and
Rs.3,000/- towards Mahr and Thavi respectively and sent the same to
the petitioner along with Exs.R.2 and R.3. Therefore, the respondent
has strictly adhered to the procedure contemplated under the
Mahomedan Law and nothing is brought on record to establish that
the respondent had deviated from the procedure at the time of
pronouncing talaq or communication of the same to the petitioner.
35 The Courts below have considered all these aspects
meticulously and arrived at a conclusion that the petitioner being a
divorced wife is not entitled to maintenance from the respondent.
36 As per the recitals of the petition, the petitioner has no means
to maintain herself. In the counter, the respondent has taken a
specific stand that the petitioner has been working as Hindi Pandit in
Vivekananda School, Gooti. To substantiate the stand of respondent,
he placed reliance on Ex.R.1 certificate issued by the Head Master of
the said school. As per the recitals of Ex.R.1, the petitioner worked as
Hindi Pandit from June 2005 to October 2006. The petitioner was
having sufficient means to maintain herself as on the date of filing of
the petition i.e. 22.08.2006. A person who suppressed material facts
is not entitled to claim relief. In the instant case, the petitioner
suppressed material facts while filing the petition under Section 125
Cr.P.C. claiming maintenance from the respondent.
37 In Padal Venkata Rama Reddy @ Ramu v Kovvuri
Satyanarayana Reddy , the Supreme Court held as follows:
In a proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court
will not enter into any findings of facts, particularly, when the
matter has been concluded by concurrent finding of facts of two
courts below.
38 Before parting with the order, this Court feels it apposite to
refer to the prevailing scenario in the society regardless of religion,
region and caste though it is somewhat painful. In recent days, the
number of matrimonial cases is abundantly increasing day by day
due to obvious reasons. Lack of patience, intolerance, unconcern,
greediness and financial independence among newly married couple
may be the root cause for the family bondage to become weak. The
present case is one such classic example. It is a matter of common
knowledge that the real cause for differences between the spouses
may be so many else other than which they are fighting in the Courts.
If the elders of both sides intervene at appropriate time and identify
the real cause for differences between the spouses, the Courts may
not be overburdened with matrimonial cases. Instead of resolving the
trivial issues in the presence of relatives or village elders, young
couples are knocking the doors of the Courts carried away by
emotions, egos and anger without visualising the evil consequences of
irretrievably breaking down of matrimonial tie, for which act the
parents are also some times wittingly or unwittingly becoming
instrumentalities. It is not exaggeration to say that by the time the
litigation comes to an end, the parties to the proceedings sufficiently
become old. It is needless to say that if the spouses approach the
Court at a young age and fight in the Courts till they become old,
thereafter, even if they realise the importance of the family life, it is
not possible for them to put the clock back. Happy departure may be
the best way, if the chances of reconciliation between the spouses are
too remote and eventually separation of spouses is inevitable under
any circumstances. It is the duty of the parents and elders to impart
the value of marital knot to the younger couple in order to enjoy the
married life in a fruitful manner.
39 For the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered
view that both the courts below have scrutinized the material
available on record in right perspective and the said findings are
based on sound reasoning and hence interference of this Court under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C is unwarranted. This petition is devoid of merit
and accordingly the same is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the
points are answered.
40 In the result the criminal petition is dismissed. As a sequel,
miscellaneous petitions, pending in this petition, if any, shall stand
closed.
____________________
T. SUNIL CHOWDARY, J
Date: 28th March, 2016
CRL.P.No.6645 OF 2010
28-03-2016
S.Rehana Sulthana @ Rehana Begum ...Petitioner
B.Mohammad Ghouse & Another...Respondent
Counsel for Petitioner : Sri K.V.Subba Reddy
Counsel for the respondent: Sri M. Bhaskar
<GIST:
>HEAD NOTE:
?Cases referred
1 2003 (1) ALT (Cri.) 369
2 (2002) 7 SCC 518
3 (2007) 6 SCC 555
4 (2008) 13 SCC 689
5 (2011) 12 SCC 347
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE T. SUNIL CHOWDARY
CRIMINAL PETITION No.6645 OF 2010
ORDER:
1 This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking
to quash the order dated 08.06.2009 passed in Crl.R.P.No.110 of
2007 by the learned Principal District & Sessions Judge, Ananthapur,
wherein and whereby the order dated 22.10.2007 passed by the
learned Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Ananthapur in M.C.No.38 of
2006 was confirmed.
2 The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the
Courts below misconstrued the scope of Sub-Section 4 of Section 125
Cr.P.C. and dismissed the petition. He would further submit that the
Courts below failed to appreciate that the petitioner left the
matrimonial home because of the harassment meted out by the
respondent and his family members. It is his further submission that
the Courts below failed to appreciate that Talaqnama dated
14.09.2006 has no legal sanctity for non-following the procedure
contemplated under Mahomedan Law. He further submitted that the
findings of the courts below are perverse as the same are not based
on any material. He further submitted that no notice was served on
the petitioner intimating the pronouncement of Talaq by the
respondent.
3 Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted
that this Court shall not lightly interfere with the concurrent findings
of fact recorded by the Courts below. He further submitted that the
findings recorded by the Courts below are supported by oral and
documentary evidence more so legally admissible evidence. He
further submitted that it is not a fit case to quash the impugned order
by invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482
Cr.P.C.
4 The facts of the case that led to the filing of the present petition
are succinctly as follows:
5 The petitioner filed a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C.
claiming maintenance of Rs.6,000/- p.m. from the respondent inter
alia stating that her marriage with the respondent was performed on
22.01.2006 as per Muslim rites and caste customs. As per the
allegations made in the petition, the parents of the petitioner gave
Rs.2.00 lakhs of cash and 12 tulas of gold to the respondent at the
time of marriage towards dowry. Immediately after the marriage, she
joined the respondent to lead marital life. The respondent and his
family members subjected her to cruelty and hence she lodged
complaint with the Station House Officer, Mahila Police station,
Ananthapur, who in turn registered a case in Cr.No.26 of 2006 under
Section 498-A of IPC. Two months prior to the filing of the petition for
maintenance the respondent necked out the petitioner from
matrimonial home without honouring the advice of the elders. Several
panchayats held to settle the dispute between the parties but in vain.
The respondent is a government employee and getting salary of
Rs.10,000/- per month. Hence the petition.
6 The respondent filed counter admitting the factum of marriage,
inter alia, contending that the petitioner stayed in the house of the
respondent for a period of ten days only. The petitioner insisted the
respondent for setting up of separate family for which the respondent
refused. Therefore, the petitioner left the house of the respondent. On
06.05.2006 the respondent got issued a notice to the petitioner
requesting her to join with him. On 18.5.2006 the petitioner executed
an agreement in the presence of the elders agreeing that she will not
insist for separate family and join with him. On 14.8.2006 the
petitioner lodged a false complaint to the Station House Officer,
Mahila Police station, Ananthapur who in turn registered it as a case
in Cr.No.26 of 2006 against the respondent and his family members
for the offence under Section 498-A of IPC. Having no other
alternative, the respondent pronounced Talaq in the presence of
elders on 14.09.2006 and sent notice to the petitioner informing
pronouncement of talaq along with demand drafts, which was
returned as unserved. The petitioner is a divorced woman and hence
she is not entitled to claim maintenance from the respondent. The
petitioner has been working as Hindi Pandit in Vivekananda High
School, Gooti and getting salary of Rs.3,000/-p.m. The respondent is
working as Lineman in A.P.TRANSCO and getting salary of Rs.4,000/-
p.m. Hence the petition may be dismissed.
7 Before the trial Court on behalf of the petitioner P.Ws.1 and 2
were examined but no document was marked. On behalf of the
respondent R.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.R.1 to R.17 were
marked.
8 The trial Court after having thoughtful consideration to the oral
and documentary evidence available on record, arrived at a
conclusion that the petitioner herself left the matrimonial home
without any justifiable reason. The trial Court further observed that
the petitioner is a divorced woman, therefore, she is not entitled to
claim maintenance from the respondent and dismissed the petition.
9 Feeling aggrieved by the order of dismissal dated 22.10.2007
passed by the trial Court in M.C.No.38 of 2006, the petitioner
preferred Crl.R.P.No.110 of 2007 before the learned Principal District
& Sessions Judge, Ananthapur. The learned Principal District &
Sessions Judge, Ananthapur after reappraising the material available
on record, fully endorsed the findings recorded by the trial Court and
dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition. Hence the present Criminal
Petition.
10 Now the points that arise for consideration in this Criminal
Petition are:
i. Whether the petitioner is entitled to claim
maintenance from the respondent?
2. Whether the findings recorded by the trial
Court are perverse, warranting interference
of this Court?
POINT Nos.1 & 2:
11 Both the points are intertwined with each other and hence I am
inclined to address these two points simultaneously in order to avoid
recapitulation of facts and evidence.
12 The chronological dates and events may throw some light on
the real controversy. The marriage of the petitioner was performed
with respondent on 22.01.2006 as per Muslim rites and caste
customs. In the presence of elders the petitioner and the respondent
entered into an agreement on 18.05.2006 in order to lead peaceful
and happy married life. Be that as it may, unfortunately bad weather
prevailed in the family life of the petitioner and respondent within no
time from the date of marriage. Basing on the complaint lodged by
the petitioner, the Station House Officer, Mahila Police station,
Ananthapur registered a case in Cr.No.26 of 2006 under Section 498-
A of IPC against the respondent and his family members on
14.8.2006. On 22.08.2006 the petitioner filed the petition before the
trial Court.
13 In order to claim maintenance, the petitioner has to satisfy the
ingredients of Sub-Sections (1) & (4) of Section 125 Cr.P.C. which
read as follows:
125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents: (1) If any
person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain:
a) his wife, unable to maintain herself; or
b) his legitimate or negligence minor child, whether married or not,
unable to maintain itself; or
c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter)
who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any
physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself; or
d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself,
Sub-Section (4) of Section 125 Cr.P.C.
No wife shall be entitled to receive an (allowance for the
maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding,
as the case may be) from her husband under this Section if she is
living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to
live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual
consent.
(Underlined by me)
14 A fascicular reading of the above two provisions clearly
demonstrates that if the husband wilfully and intentionally neglects to
provide maintenance to his wife, then she can approach the Court
seeking maintenance. At the same time, wife is not entitled to claim
maintenance from her husband if she left the matrimonial home
without any cause much less justifiable cause.
15 To substantiate the case, the petitioner examined herself as
P.W.1. Her father was examined as P.W.2. To demolish the case of
the petitioner, the respondent examined himself as R.W.1 and got
marked Exs.R.1 to R.17. R.W.2 was examined to prove
pronouncement of Talaq. The petitioner knocked the doors of the
Court on 22.08.2006 seeking maintenance from the respondent as
she is unable to maintain herself. The underlying object of Section
125 Cr.P.C. is to wipe off the tears of the destitute wife and the
children who were mercilessly thrown out of the matrimonial home,
for no fault of them.
16 As per the testimony of P.W.1, the respondent and his family
members subjected her to cruelty and hence she left the matrimonial
home on 12.08.2006. As per the testimony of R.W.1, the petitioner
stayed with him for hardly ten days and left the house on the ground
that he did not heed her request to set up separate family. The
respondent got issued legal notice on 06.05.2006 (Ex.R.4 is the office
copy of the legal notice) requesting the petitioner to join with him to
lead marital life. Ex.R.6 is the acknowledgement. Whatever deposed
by R.W.1 is reflecting in Ex.R.4 legal notice. For one reason or the
other the petitioner did not choose to issue reply to Ex.R.4. If rally
the respondent and his family members subjected the petitioner to
cruelty what prevented her to give a befitting reply narrating the
alleged torture being undergone by her at her in-laws home? In the
cross examination P.W.1 in unequivocal terms deposed that she
executed an agreement Ex.R.7 in the presence of elders with an
undertaking that she will not insist the respondent for setting up
separate family. If really the petitioner did not pester the respondent
persistently to set up separate family, what made her to subscribe her
signature on Ex.R.7 agreement? The Court shall not lose sight of the
human conduct while appreciating the rival contentions of the parties
to the proceedings, more particularly in family matters, wherein the
possibility of distortion of facts by the parties to the proceedings in
order to gain sympathy of the court cannot be ruled out completely. If
really the petitioner has suffered in the hands of the respondent and
his family members, certainly she might have availed the opportunity
of issuing a befitting reply to the legal notice (Ex.R.4) issued by the
respondent or she might have exposed the alleged misdeeds of the
family of the respondent in the presence of the elders on 18.05.2006.
This Court is very much conscious that non-issuance of reply by the
petitioner itself is not a sufficient ground to draw adverse inference
against her without considering the other attending circumstances.
Within three months from the date of panchayat the petitioner lodged
complaint against the respondent and his family members for the
offence under section 498-A of IPC. Though the petitioner is resident
of Gooti, for the reasons best known to her she lodged the complaint
on the file of Station House Officer, Mahila Police Station,
Ananthapur.
17 Establishment of the ingredients of Section 125 Cr.P.C. is sine
qua non for granting of maintenance. In the instant case, the
petitioner failed to prove that she left the matrimonial home because
of the harassment meted out by the respondent and his family
members.
18 The material available on record clearly establishes that the
petitioner herself left the matrimonial home without any justifiable
reason which disentitled her to claim maintenance under Section 125
Cr.P.C. I am fully endorsing the findings recorded by the courts
below on this aspect.
19 The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
respondent has not followed the procedure as contemplated under the
Mahomedan Law either at the time of pronouncement talaq or with
regard to the proper communication of the talaqnama to the
petitioner, therefore, the talaq alleged to have been pronounced by the
respondent does not withstand judicial scrutiny. Therefore, the
petitioner is entitled to claim maintenance from the respondent under
Section 125 Cr.P.C. In this case, it has to be seen whether the
pronouncement of talaq by the respondent and communication of the
talaqnama are not in accordance with the procedure contemplated
under Mahomedan Law; and if it is so, the petitioner is entitled to
claim maintenance from the respondent.
20 Chapter XVI of Mullas Mahomedan Law, Nineteenth Edition,
describes divorce. Section 307 deals with different forms of divorce,
which reads as under:
The contract of marriage under the Mahomedan Law will be
dissolved in any one of the following ways: (1) by the husband at his
will, without the intervention of a Court; (2) by mutual consent of the
husband and wife, without the intervention of a Court; (3) by a
judicial decree at the suit of the husband or wife. The wife cannot
divorce herself from her husband without his consent, except under a
contract whether made before or after marriage, but she may, in some
cases. Obtain a divorce by judicial decree.
When the divorce proceeds from the husband, it is called
talaq; when it is effected by mutual consent, it is called khula or
mubara at according to the terms of the contract between the parties.
21 Section 308 deals with divorce by talaq, which reads as under:
Any Mahomedan of sound mind, who has attained puberty,
may divorce his wife whenever he desires without assigning any
cause.
22 As per Section 310, talaq may be oral or in writing. A
Talaqnama may only be the record of the fact of pronouncement of
talaq or it may be the deed by which the divorce is effected. The deed
may be executed in the presence of the Kazi or of the wifes father or
of other witnesses. The deed is said to be in the customary form if it
is properly superscribed and addressed so as to show the name of the
writer and the person addressed.
23 In Zamrud Begum Vs. K.Md.Haneef this Court held as follows:
16. I am of the considered view that the alleged
talaq is not a valid talaq as it is not in accordance with
the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. If
there is no valid talaq the relationship of the wife with
her husband still continues and she cannot be treated
as a divorced wife. She can be treated as only a
deserted wife.
24 In Shamim Ara Vs. State of U.P the Honble Honble apex
Court held as follows:
13. There is yet another illuminating and weighty judicial opinion
available in two decisions of the Gauhati High Court recorded by
Baharul Islam, J. (later a Judge of the Supreme Court of India) sitting
singly in Jiauddin Ahmed v. Anwara Begum {(1981) 1 Gau LR 358}
and later speaking for the Division Bench in Rukia Khatun v. Abdul
Khalique Laskar {(1981) 1 Gau LR 375}. In Jiauddin Ahmed case a
plea of previous divorce i.e. the husband having divorced the wife on
some day much previous to the date of filing of the written statement
in the Court was taken and upheld. The question posed before the
High Court was whether there has been valid talaq of the wife by the
husband under the Muslim law. The learned Judge observed that
though marriage under the Muslim law is only a civil contract yet the
rights and responsibilities consequent upon it are of such importance
to the welfare of humanity, that a high degree of sanctity is attached
to it. But in spite of the sacredness of the character of the marriage
tie, Islam recognizes the necessity, in exceptional circumstances, of
keeping the way open for its dissolution (para 6). Quoting in the
judgment several Holy Quranic verses and from commentaries
thereon by well-recognized scholars of great eminence, the learned
Judge expressed disapproval of the statement that the whimsical
and capricious divorce by the husband is good in law, though bad in
theology and observed that such a statement is based on the concept
that women were chattel belonging to men, which the Holy Quran
does not brook. The correct law of talaq as ordained by the Holy
Quran is that talaq must be for a reasonable cause and be preceded
by attempts at reconciliation between the husband and the wife by
two arbiters one from the wifes family and the other from the
husbands; if the attempts fail, talaq may be effected (para 13). In
Rukia Khatun case, the Division Bench stated that the correct law of
talaq, as ordained by the Holy Quran, is: (i) that talaq must be for a
reasonable cause; and (ii) that it must be preceded by an attempt of
reconciliation between the husband and the wife by two arbiters, one
chosen by the wife from her family and the other by the husband
from his. If their attempts fail, talaq may be effected. The Division
Bench expressly recorded its dissent from the Calcutta and Bombay
views which, in their opinion, did not lay down the correct law.
25 Let me consider the facts of the case on hand on touchstone
with the provisions of Mahomedan Law and also in the light of the
principle enunciated by this Court and the Honble apex Court in the
cases cited supra.
26 As per the testimony of R.W.2, at the request of R.W.1 and his
family members they approached the petitioner and requested her
family members to come to the mosque at Gooti for settlement of the
dispute between the couple on 14.09.2006. His testimony further
reveals that on 14.09.2006 neither the petitioner nor her parents
appeared before the Kazi in order to resolve the dispute. As per the
testimony of R.W.1 on 14.09.2006 he pronounced talaq before the
Kazi in the presence of R.W.2, Abdul Rehman and Ibrahim. Even as
per the testimony of R.W.2, R.W.1 pronounced talaq in the presence
of Kazi and himself. In the cross-examination of R.Ws.1 and 2
nothing is elicited to shake their testimony so far as pronouncement
of talaq by R.W.1 on 14.09.2006 is concerned. The testimony of R.W.2
clearly reveals that Ex.R.8 Talaqnama bears his signature.
27 Before pronouncement of talaq, the respondent invited the
petitioner and her family members to come to the mosque on
14.09.2006 to resolve the dispute between them. For one reason or
the other, neither the petitioner nor her parents turn up to the said
panchayat. The respondent has taken a specific stand that he
requested the petitioner and her parents to attend the panchayat to
be held on 14.09.2006 in the mosque at Gooti. It is not elicited in
the cross examination of R.W.1 that he did not invite the family
members of the petitioner to the mosque on 14.09.2006. The material
placed before the trail Court clinchingly establishes that the
respondent made every attempt for reconciliation prior to the
pronouncement of talaq with a fond hope that the petitioner may join
him to lead happy marital life. The attempt of the respondent for
reconciliation in the presence of elders and Kazi also went in vain.
28 Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and
also the principle enunciated in the cases cited supra, I am of the
considered view that the respondent has strictly adhered to the
procedure as contemplated under the Mahomedan Law in order to
give effect to the talaq.
29 Under Mahomedan Law, the talaq pronounced by the husband
will come to effect from the date it was communicated to the wife. As
per the testimony of R.W.1 immediately after pronouncing talaq, he
communicated the same to the petitioner by registered post with
acknowledgement due. Exs.R.2 and R.3 are the un-served envelopes.
As per the endorsement made on Exs.R.2 and R.3, the petitioner was
continuously absent for seven days. On the same day i.e. 14.09.2006
the respondent also got issued a notice to the petitioner intimating
the pronouncement of talaq. Ex.R.9 is the office copy of the notice and
Ex.R.10 is the acknowledgement. A perusal of the record reveals that
the respondent sent copy of the talaqnama Ex.R.11 to Ashraf of Asrar
mosque in order to comply with the religious requirement.
30 The respondent sent Exs.R.2 and R.3 to the address where the
petitioner has been ordinarily residing with her parents. In the cross
examination P.W.1 in unequivocal terms deposed that she has been
residing in the address to which Exs.R.2 and R.3 were sent. The
crucial question for determination is whether the Courts below were
justified in drawing a presumption that notice was served on the
petitioner or not?
31 In C.C.Alavi Haji Vs. Palapetty Muhammed the Honble
Honble apex Court held as follows:
13. According to Section 114 of the Act, read with Illustration (f)
thereunder, when it appears to the court that the common course of
business renders it probable that a thing would happen, the court
may draw presumption that the thing would have happened, unless
there are circumstances in a particular case to show that the common
course of business was not followed. Thus, Section 114 enables the
court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to
have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural
events, human conduct and public and private business in their
relation to the facts of the particular case. Consequently, the court
can presume that the common course of business has been followed
in particular cases. When applied to communications sent by post,
Section 114 enables the court to presume that in the common course
of natural events, the communication would have been delivered at
the address of the addressee. But the presumption that is raised
under Section 27 of the GC Act is a far stronger presumption.
Further, while Section 114 of the Evidence Act refers to a general
presumption, Section 27 refers to a specific presumption. For the sake
of ready reference, Section 27 of the GC Act is extracted below:
27. Meaning of service by post.Where any Central Act or
Regulation made after the commencement of this Act
authorises or requires any document to be served by post,
whether the expression serve or either of the expression give
or send or any other expression is used, then, unless a
different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be
effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by
registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless
the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at
which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of
post.
14. Section 27 gives rise to a presumption that service of notice
has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered
post. In view of the said presumption, when stating that a notice has
been sent by registered post to the address of the drawer, it is
unnecessary to further aver in the complaint that in spite of the
return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that
the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless and
until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is
deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would
have been delivered in the ordinary course of business. This Court
has already held that when a notice is sent by registered post and is
returned with a postal endorsement refused or not available in the
house or house locked or shop closed or addressee not in
station, due service has to be presumed. (Vide Jagdish Singh v.
Natthu Singh {(1992) 1 SCC 647} State of M.P. v. Hiralal {(1996) 7 SCC
523} and V. Raja Kumari v. P. Subbarama Naidu {(2004) 8 SCC 774}.
It is, therefore, manifest that in view of the presumption available
under Section 27 of the Act, it is not necessary to aver in the
complaint under Section 138 of the Act that service of notice was
evaded by the accused or that the accused had a role to play in the
return of the notice unserved.
32 In Subodh S.Salaskar Vs. Jayprakash M. Shah the Honble
Honble apex Court held as follows:
24. Presumption of service, under the statute, would arise
not only when it is sent by registered post in terms of Section
27 of the General Clauses Act but such a presumption may be
raised also under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. Even when
a notice is received back with an endorsement that the party
has refused to accept, still then a presumption can be raised as
regards the valid service of notice. Such a notice, as has been
held by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in C.C. Alavi Haji v.
Palapetty Muhammed {(2007) 6 SCC 555} should be construed
liberally.
33 As per the principle enunciated in the cases cited supra, the
Court can draw a presumption that the notice was served on the
party to the proceedings if the same was sent by registered post with
acknowledgement due to the address where he or she ordinarily
resides unless and until the contrary is proved. It is not the case of
the petitioner that at the relevant point of time, she was not residing
in the address as mentioned on Ex.R.2 and R.3 envelopes. Having
regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and also the
principle enunciated in the cases cited supra, I am of the considered
view that the notice was served on the petitioner.
34 A divorced Muslim woman is entitled for maintenance during
the iddat period in view of Section 3 (i) (a) of the Muslim Women
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. As seen from the
testimony of R.W.1 he obtained demand draft for Rs.5,215/- and
Rs.3,000/- towards Mahr and Thavi respectively and sent the same to
the petitioner along with Exs.R.2 and R.3. Therefore, the respondent
has strictly adhered to the procedure contemplated under the
Mahomedan Law and nothing is brought on record to establish that
the respondent had deviated from the procedure at the time of
pronouncing talaq or communication of the same to the petitioner.
35 The Courts below have considered all these aspects
meticulously and arrived at a conclusion that the petitioner being a
divorced wife is not entitled to maintenance from the respondent.
36 As per the recitals of the petition, the petitioner has no means
to maintain herself. In the counter, the respondent has taken a
specific stand that the petitioner has been working as Hindi Pandit in
Vivekananda School, Gooti. To substantiate the stand of respondent,
he placed reliance on Ex.R.1 certificate issued by the Head Master of
the said school. As per the recitals of Ex.R.1, the petitioner worked as
Hindi Pandit from June 2005 to October 2006. The petitioner was
having sufficient means to maintain herself as on the date of filing of
the petition i.e. 22.08.2006. A person who suppressed material facts
is not entitled to claim relief. In the instant case, the petitioner
suppressed material facts while filing the petition under Section 125
Cr.P.C. claiming maintenance from the respondent.
37 In Padal Venkata Rama Reddy @ Ramu v Kovvuri
Satyanarayana Reddy , the Supreme Court held as follows:
In a proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court
will not enter into any findings of facts, particularly, when the
matter has been concluded by concurrent finding of facts of two
courts below.
38 Before parting with the order, this Court feels it apposite to
refer to the prevailing scenario in the society regardless of religion,
region and caste though it is somewhat painful. In recent days, the
number of matrimonial cases is abundantly increasing day by day
due to obvious reasons. Lack of patience, intolerance, unconcern,
greediness and financial independence among newly married couple
may be the root cause for the family bondage to become weak. The
present case is one such classic example. It is a matter of common
knowledge that the real cause for differences between the spouses
may be so many else other than which they are fighting in the Courts.
If the elders of both sides intervene at appropriate time and identify
the real cause for differences between the spouses, the Courts may
not be overburdened with matrimonial cases. Instead of resolving the
trivial issues in the presence of relatives or village elders, young
couples are knocking the doors of the Courts carried away by
emotions, egos and anger without visualising the evil consequences of
irretrievably breaking down of matrimonial tie, for which act the
parents are also some times wittingly or unwittingly becoming
instrumentalities. It is not exaggeration to say that by the time the
litigation comes to an end, the parties to the proceedings sufficiently
become old. It is needless to say that if the spouses approach the
Court at a young age and fight in the Courts till they become old,
thereafter, even if they realise the importance of the family life, it is
not possible for them to put the clock back. Happy departure may be
the best way, if the chances of reconciliation between the spouses are
too remote and eventually separation of spouses is inevitable under
any circumstances. It is the duty of the parents and elders to impart
the value of marital knot to the younger couple in order to enjoy the
married life in a fruitful manner.
39 For the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered
view that both the courts below have scrutinized the material
available on record in right perspective and the said findings are
based on sound reasoning and hence interference of this Court under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C is unwarranted. This petition is devoid of merit
and accordingly the same is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the
points are answered.
40 In the result the criminal petition is dismissed. As a sequel,
miscellaneous petitions, pending in this petition, if any, shall stand
closed.
____________________
T. SUNIL CHOWDARY, J
Date: 28th March, 2016
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