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Whether the benefits of the Hindu Succession Act are available to the appellants therein. The facts of the cited case are as follows: The appellants and the respondents are siblings being daughters and sons of one Ch. Venkata Swamy. The 1st respondent filed a suit for partition impleading his father (D1), his brother (D2) and his two sisters (the appellants-D3 and D4). The A, C, and D schedule properties are coparcenary property. The plaintiff claimed 1/3rd share for him and the defendants 1 and 2 (his father and brother). The preliminary decree granted in March 1999 declared that the plaintiff has got 1/3rd share in the said properties. Before passing the final decree, by 2005 Amendment Act, Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was substituted. The appellants (D3 and D4) made an application for passing preliminary decree in their favour for partition of A, C and D coparcenary properties into four equal shares and allotment of one such share each to them as the 1st defendant died during the pendency of the suit. The said application was contested by the plaintiff. The trial Court by its order dated 15.06.2009 allowed the application of the appellants (D3 and D4) and had held that they were entitled for re-allotment of shares in the preliminary decree, i.e., they are entitled to 1/4th share each and separate possession in A, C and D schedule properties. The said order was challenged before this Court in an appeal. A learned single Judge of this court allowed the appeal and had set aside the order of the trial court. The appellants (D3 and D4) preferred an appeal by Special Leave before the Honble Supreme Court. While answering the question as to whether the preliminary decree passed by the trial court deprived the appellants/daughters of the benefits of 2005 Amendment Act although final decree for partition has not yet been passed, the Honble Supreme Court had held in favour of the daughters and had set aside the orders of this Court and had restored the order of the trial court. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part and the preliminary decree passed by the trial Court insofar as it related to determination of shares of the sharers is set aside by holding that the plaintiffs 2 and 3 and the 1st defendant are entitled to a 5/16th share each and that the 1st plaintiff is entitled to a 1/16th share in both the plaint A and B schedule properties. Accordingly, a preliminary decree is passed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the 1st defendant for partition of plaint A and B schedule properties into sixteen (16) equal and equitable shares by metes and bounds and according to good and bad qualities and for allotment of a 5/16th share each to the plaintiffs 2 and 3 and the 1st defendant and the remaining 1/16th share to the 1st plaintiff. There shall be no order as to costs.

Ex.B4 executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendants is release deed or relinquishment deed but not settlement deed as defined under Section 2 (24) of the Act of 1899 or under Section 2 (b) of the Act of 1963.= Moreover, recitals of Ex.B4 did not indicate intention of any of the parties to execute registered relinquishment deed or settlement deed in favour of the defendants and, taking advantage of stray admissions in the evidence of D.W.1, learned counsel for the plaintiff invented a theory that Ex.B4 is only an agreement but this cannot be accepted in the absence of any recital that the plaintiff agreed to execute registered document in pursuance of Ex.B4.and, therefore, this contention is without any substance. Ex.B4 is only a release or relinquishment deed which does not require registration and it is admissible in evidence. =Ex.B4 in evidence and, basing the plaintiff is ceased to be a member of Hindu undivided coparcenary after execution of Ex.4 as he relinquished or given up his right in the property of Hindu undivided coparcenary.

The Executing Court has no power to appoint an Advocate Commissioner under Order 26 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure in execution proceedings and as such, the orders, appointing Advocate Commissioner are totally without jurisdiction.- The facts and circumstances of the cases and the principles and parameters laid down in the above referred judgments drive this Court towards an irresistible conclusion that the petitioner herein has totally failed in making out a case, warranting any interference or indulgence of this Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contentions sought to be pressed into service by the learned counsel for the petitioner are liable to be rejected as being devoid of any merit. The fact remains that the decree holder is seeking specific performance of contract in respect of the property within the boundaries as mentioned in the suit agreement of sale and decree only and in the name of mis- description of one of the survey numbers, the legitimate right of the decree holder cannot be permitted to be frustrated. Therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Court below correctly exercised its jurisdiction to enable the decree holder to get the fruits of the decree. In the instant case the entire effort of the judgment debtor is obviously to get the suit claim frustrated, which cannot be permitted.