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Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - Cheque was issued by and on behalf of the firm - Notice issued about the dishonor of cheque - after completion of Trial - pending the case A2 died on 2-12-2006 - Trail court dismissed the complaint against the A1 firm and A2 as abated and after hearing the A 3 and A4 dismissed the case on merits - Whether Firm A1 too abated when it was represented by A3 and A4 other partners ? for the purpose of imposing fine of double the amount, the death of A2 does not abate the firm as other partners can continue the firm on the death of one of the partner as per law - Remanded the matter to decide the case on the point whether the firm dissolved or not with reference to the D-1 partnership deed already exhibited, from death of A-2 one of the partners and if not dissolved for nothing to abate to decide the liability of A-1 firm though not A-3 representing A-1 firm personally liable, to the liability of imposing fine against the firm in the event of the debt is proved legally enforceable - 2015 A.P.msklawreports

Who is the competent authority to determine the dues of Workmen when the company in Liquidation ? once the company is in winding up, the only competent authority to determine the workmens dues is the liquidator who obviously has to act under the supervision of the Company Court and by no other authority.-2015 A.P. MSKLAWREPROTS

question of jurisdiction = the principal Civil Court locating in Hyderabad cannot be a Court within the meaning of Section 2 (1) (e) of the aforesaid Act as no part of cause of action has arisen nor the respondents are having place of business within the territorial limit of this State. It would appear from said tripartite agreement that the same was executed and entered into at Bangalore. Works in terms of the contract is to be executed at Bangalore. Hence, performance of tripartite agreement has to be done in Bangalore. Nothing has happened in Hyderabad except the 2nd respondent is having his place of business at Hyderabad. It is settled position of law that by agreement of the parties jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon any Court which does not have under law. Admittedly, the agreement has been made and entered into at Bangalore, works which are to be performed in terms of bipartite agreement initially, now tripartite one at Bangalore, and performance and non-performance therefore, necessarily will take place at Bangalore. It is however argued that I can entertain this application by virtue of clause (b) of Section 20 of Code of Civil Procedure as one of the respondents carries on business at Hyderabad. This provision cannot be invoked having regard to approach of the application wherein seat of arbitration being Hyderabad is sought to be asserted, and no leave as required under clause (b) of Section 20 of C.P.C. has been asked for. In view of discussion, as above, no answer is called for as far as third question is concerned. In view of discussion above, I dismiss this application with liberty to file before appropriate Honble Chief Justice or designated Judge, as the case may be, of the High Court.-2015 A.P. MSK LAWREPORTS

It is settled principle of law that in the field of expertise, the Court cannot substitute its own opinion in order to discard any experts suggestion, on which, the Government has acted upon, in particular in absence of counter expertise. In this context, we have seen the order dated 24.7.2008, which is the ultimate decision of the Government. In paragraph-5 thereof, we have noticed the Government has acted on the basis of the report of the Chief Engineer, North Coast, Visakhapatnam. The relevant portion thereof is set out hereunder. Government have examined the matter carefully, keeping in view of the report of Chief Engineer, North Coast, Visakhapatnam. It is decided to accept the proposal of the Chief Engineer, North Coast, Visakhapatnam. Accordingly, administrative approval for an estimate of Rs.70.47 crores (Rupees Seventy Crores and Forty Seven Lakhs Only) is accorded to take up the work relating to excavation of Gajapathipalem Branch Canal taking off from KM 97.7 of Thotapalli Right Main Canal to provide irrigation facilities to additional area of 15,000 acres beyond Gadigedda by allowing canal water to cross Gadigedda by means of an aqua duct. Therefore, it is clear from the aforesaid Government Order that it has not passed the order without any material. The report of the Chief Engineer, North Coast, Visakhapatnam has been considered and thereafter decision has been taken. It is not suggested that Chief Engineer has no competence. The Court cannot interfere with a decision taken by the Government rationally, so to say, with the acceptable materials. This project, no doubt, involves lot of civil engineering and it is within the realm of technical expertise. The report of the Chief Engineer has not been brought to our notice nor it has been alleged that the said report is un- acceptable in any sense. In other words, the report of the Chief Engineer has not been challenged here on the ground of illegality or irrationality. In the absence of these allegations, we are unable to entertain the grievance of the petitioner. Under the circumstances, the writ petition is devoid of any merit and it is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, the miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall also stand closed. No order as to costs.

One Smt. Bhuma Shoba Nagi Reddy since deceased (hereinafter referred to as deceased) filed her nomination being fielded by Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Congress Party (hereinafter referred to as YSR Congress Party), an unrecognized political party registered with the 1st respondent to contest election in Allagadda Assembly segment. However, the said deceased died in a road accident on 24.04.2014 at about 11.00 a.m. without withdrawing her nomination on or before 23rd April, 2014. Since YSR Congress Party is unrecognized registered political party, election cannot be adjourned under the present provisions of Section 52 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) on account of death as above. At the same time, election ought not to have been allowed to be held with the dead candidate and the name of the deceased should have been deleted from the list of contesting parties as from the date of death and to that of poll there was a clear gap of 14 days.= (1) If an election, (the term election being widely interpreted so as to include all steps and entire proceedings commencing from the date of notification of election till the date of declaration of result) is to be called in question and which questioning may have the effect of interrupting, obstructing or protracting the election proceedings in any manner, the invoking of judicial remedy has to be postponed till after the completing of proceedings in elections. (2) Any decision sought and rendered will not amount to calling in question an election if it subserves the progress of the election and facilitates the completion of the election. Anything done towards completing or in furtherance of the election proceedings cannot be described as questioning the election. (3) Subject to the above, the action taken or orders issued by Election Commission are open to judicial review on the well- settled parameters which enable judicial review of decisions of statutory bodies such as on a case of malafide or arbitrary exercise of power being made out or the statutory body being shown to have acted in breach of law. (4) Without interrupting, obstructing or delaying the progress of the election proceedings, judicial intervention is available if assistance of the court has been sought for merely to correct or smoothen the progress of the election proceedings, to remove the obstacles therein, or to preserve a vital piece of evidence if the same would be lost or destroyed or rendered irretrievable by the time the results are declared and stage is set for invoking the jurisdiction of the court. (5) The court must be very circumspect and act with caution while entertaining any election dispute though not hit by the bar of Article 329(b) but brought to it during the pendency of election proceedings. The court must guard against any attempt at retarding, interrupting, protracting or stalling of the election proceedings. Care has to be taken to see that there is no attempt to utilise the courts indulgence by filing a petition outwardly innocuous but essentially a subterfuge or pretext for achieving an ulterior or hidden end. Needless to say that in the very nature of the things the court would act with reluctance and shall not act, except on a clear and strong case for its intervention having been made out by raising the pleas with particulars and precision and supporting the same by necessary material. This Court would therefore not entertain or act upon a writ petition which is outwardly innocuous but is essentially a subterfuge or pretext for achieving an ulterior or hidden end. The consequential prayers of the petitioners in both the subject cases manifest that they sought to obstruct the natural flow of the ongoing election process. One wanted deletion of the name of the deceased candidate from the list of contesting candidates before the election while the other wanted the votes polled by the deceased candidate to be treated as invalid and the election to be decided on the basis of the votes polled by the remaining candidates.

Under what circumstances, the Lokayukta can entertain complaints against other public servants is elaborated in Section 7(1) clause (4) which we set out hereunder: 7. Matters which may be investigated by Lokayukta or Upa- Lokayukta:-- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Lokayukta may investigate any action which is taken by, or with the general or specific approval of, or at the behest of,-- (i) (ii) (iii) (iii)(a) (iv) any other public servant, belonging to such class or section of public servants, as may be notified by the government in this behalf after consultation with the Lokayukta, in any case where a complaint involving an allegation is made in respect of such action, or such action can be or could have been, in the opinion of the Lokayukta, the subject of an allegation. Unlike other clauses, under the aforesaid clause there must be a complaint involving an allegation. Again the word allegation has been defined in Section 2(b) of the Act, which is set out hereunder: 2(b) allegation in relation to a public servant means any affirmation that such public servant (i) has abused his position as such, to obtain any gain or favour to himself or to any other person, or to cause undue harm or hardship to any other person; (ii) was actuated in the discharge of his functions as such public servant by improper or corrupt motive and thereby caused loss to the State or any member or section of the public; or (iii) is guilty of corruption, or lack of integrity in his capacity as such public servant; Thus, on a conjoint reading of sub-sections (i), (ii) and (iii) of sub- section (b) of Section 2 and Section 7 of the Act, we think that the Upa- Lokayukta can entertain complaints only when there are prima facie allegations with particulars fitting requirements of clauses (i)(ii)(iii) referred to above. We have already culled out the gist of the complaint made against the Tahsildar and we not find any such allegation made in the complaint. In addition to what has been found by the Upalokayukta, we also find in the complaint, reading on the face of it, it does not confer the jurisdiction on the Upa-Lokayukta.

whether we can entertain the Writ Petition for issuance of writ of Prohibition treating the instant Arbitral Tribunal is having a statutory character. We think that this Court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of Prohibition for the reasons as stated hereunder and the same are backed by the materials supplied by the petitioner itself.